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NOTES 
Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre: The New, New Equal 
Protection 
I. THE Boraas CASE 
In Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre1 a group of unrelated college 
students who rented a home in Belle Terre challenged a zoning or. 
dinance that limited home occupancy to persons related by blood, 
marriage, or adoption. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 
finding for the students, decided the case using a novel equal protec-
tion theory, and the Supreme Court reversed. This Note deals with 
the theory adopted by the Second Circuit, its sources, and its future 
in light of the subsequent Supreme Court opinion in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez2 and the Supreme Court's 
analysis of Boraas under a more traditional standard. 
The Village of Belle Terre is zoned exclusively for one-family 
dwellings. A "family" is defined as "[o]ne or more persons related by 
blood, adoption or marriage, living and cooking together as a single 
housekeeping unit ... [A] number of persons but not exceeding two (2) 
living and cooking together as a single housekeeping unit though not 
related by blood, adoption, or marriage shall be deemed to constitute 
a family."3 In January 1972, Edwin and Judith Dickman, owners of 
a single-family residence in Belle Terre, rented their house to six 
unrelated students attending a university located approximately 
seven miles from Belle Terre. On July 31, 1972, the Dickmans were 
ordered to remedy the ordinance violations. 
On August 2, 1972, three of the students-Bruce Boraas, Anne 
Parish, and Michael Truman-and the Dickmans, filed an action in 
the district court under the Civil Rights Act of 18714 against the 
mayor and trustees of Belle Terre. They sought both injunctive relief 
against enforcement of the ordinance and a declaratory judgment 
invalidating as unconstitutional the ordinance's prohibition against 
1. 476 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1973), revd., 42 U.S.L.W. 4475 (U.S., April 1, 1974). Another 
case in which a federal court adopted a new equal protection test is Aiello v. Hansen, 
359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (three-judge court), prob. juris. noted sub nom. 
Geduldig v. Aiello, 42 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Dec., 11, 1973) (No. 73-640). 
2. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
3. Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance, art. I, § D-l.35a, June 8, 1970, quoted 
in 476 F.2d at 809. The enforcement provision of the ordinance provides: "Each 
violation of this ordinance shall constitute disorderly conduct." Punishment for a 
violation shall be by "a penalty not exceeding One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) or by 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 60 days or by both such fine and imprison-
ment." Belle Terre, N.Y., Building Zone Ordinance, art VIII, part 4, § M-l.4a(2), Oct. 
17, 1971, quoted in 476 F.2d at 809. 
4. 42 u.s.c. § 1983 (1970). 
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residential occupancy by more than nvo unrelated persons.5 The 
district court upheld the ordinance. On appeal, the Second Circuit 
reversed, Judge Timbers dissenting. Several weeks later a petition 
for a rehearing en bane was denied by a four-four vote.6 Probable 
jurisdiction has been noted by the Supreme Court.7 
Eschewing the Euclidean due process/police power analysis under 
which courts customarily review zoning ordinances,8 the court of 
appeals decided the case under the equal protection clause.9 Legisla-
tion undergoing equal protection review is generally analyzed under 
one of two standards, termed by the Boraas court the "minimal 
scrutiny test" and the "compelling state interest test."10 Under the 
minimal scrutiny test, only a classification that is purely arbitrary,11 
lacking any reasonable connection benveen legislative means and 
ends, violates the clause.12 The inquiry made by the court can be 
based on purely hypothetical justifications: "[A] statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be con-
5. The complaint alleged that the ordinance denied the plaintiffs equal protection 
of the laws, violated their right of association, intruded on their right of privacy, 
impinged upon their freedom to live with whom they pleased, and contravened their 
right to travel. 476 F.2d at 813. 
6. 476 F.2d at 824. 
7. 42 U.S.L.W. 3226 (U.S., Oct. 15, 1973). Boraas is not a typical exclusionary zoning 
case. The Belle Terre ordinance excludes certain groups of people, while the usual 
exclusionary zoning ordinance excludes certain types or sizes of buildings. See, e.g., 
Vickers v. Township Comm., 37 N.J. 232, 181 A.2d 129 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 
U.S. 233 (1963) (mobile homes); Grish Appeal, 437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970) (apart-
ments); Lionshed Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89 A.2d 693 (1952), 
appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) (minimum dwelling size requirements). See generally 
Note, Exclusionary Zoning and Equat Protection, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1645 (1971); Note, 
The Equal Protection Cmuse and Exclusionary Zoning After Valtierra and Dandridge, 
81 YALE L.J. 61 (1971); Note, The Constitutionality of Local Zoning, 79 YALE L.J. 896 
(1970). For a complete bibliography, see 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 627 (1971). 
8. The court described the traditional standard of review for zoning cases as follows: 
Where such regulations represent a valid exercise of delegated state police power 
and are designed to promote or protect the public health, safety or welfare, the 
individual's right must give way to the particular concern of the community. • • • 
• • • Ordinarily a court will intervene to declai;e a zoning ordinance to be a 
denial of due process only where it cannot be supported by a substantial public 
interest. Traditionally it may be justified by showing that it is related to such 
matters as safety, population density, adequacy of light and air, noise and necessity 
for traffic control, transportation, sewerage, school, park and other public services. 
476 F.2d at 812, dting Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Zahn v. Board 
of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927); Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 2:17 U.S. 183 (1928). 
9. "To the requirement that zoning laws must satisfy due process, as thus enunciated 
by Euclid and its brethren, there must be added the important, condition that they not 
discriminate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause." 476 F.2d at 813. 
10. 476 F.2d at 814. 
11. Under this standard the Court has upheld some classifications that appear 
arbitrary on their face. See, e.g., Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot 
Commrs., 330 U.S. 552 (1947). · 
12. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The Supreme Court 
upheld the ordinance using this test. 42 U.S.LW. at 4477. 
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ceived to justify it."13 In the present case, the defendants argued that 
"the ordinance might conceivably be justified as a measure designed 
to curb population density and excessive rental costs, or to preserve 
the traditional family character of the neighborhood."14 The com-
pelling state interest test is of more recent vintage. If legislation 
impinges on an interest that is deemed "fundamental,"16 or if the 
classification involved is "suspect,"16 the challenged legislation will 
be sustained only if it is precisely tailored so as to accomplish the 
state's purpose,17 less onerous means are not available,18 and the state 
can demonstrate that the legislation is necessary to further a "com-
pelling governmental interest."19 The appellants claimed that the 
zoning ordinance interfered with a number of fundamental rights, 
including their rights of privacy, association, and travel, and stated 
that no compelling interest could justify the ordinance.20 The court 
noted that recent efforts to augment the number of suspect classifica-
tions and fundamental interests had been unsuccessful21 and that, 
while "the rights claimed by appellants are . . . more personal and 
basic in nature than those of commercial interests .•. , the present 
case [does not] fit snugly into any of the other categories recognized 
as requiring application of the compelling state interest test."22 
13. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee 
Optical of Okla., Inc., 349 U.S. 483 (1955). See generally Tussman &: ten Brock, The 
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 341 {1949); Developments in the Law--
Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1065 (1969). 
14. 476 F.2d at 813. 
15. "Fundamental rights" include the right of personal privacy, Roe v. Wade, 410 
U.S. 113 (1973); the right of interstate travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); 
the right to vote, Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); the right to procreate, Skinner 
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); the rights guaranteed by the first 
amendment, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); and, perhaps, the right to the 
essential facilities for prosecution of a criminal appeal, Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956). 
16. "Suspect classifications" include classifications based on race, McLaughlin· v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); alienage, Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); 
ancestry, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1947); and, at least when there is a total 
deprivation of an important entitlement, wealth, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent 
School Dist., 411 U.S. I, 20 (1973). 
17. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 351-52, 357-58 (1972); Kramer v. Union 
Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969). 
18. E.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972). 
19. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972), quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis original). 
20. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477. They are 
expounded in Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and 
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L R.Ev. 767 (1969); Comment, All in the "Family": Legal Prob-
lems of Communes, 7 HARV. CIV. RlcHTS-Ctv. LIB, L. R.Ev. 393 (1972). Sager was of 
counsel to the petitioners in Boraas. 
21. 476 F.2d at 813, citing Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing); Dandridge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (welfare benefits). See also United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 
434 (1973) (no fundamental right to a discharge in bankruptcy). 
22. 476 F.2d at 813-14. 
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The court did not, however, directly reject the appellants' argu-
ments. It professed to be relieved that it did not have to decide if 
there had been an infringement of the right of privacy or travel and 
proceeded to enunciate its own standard of review, a third equal 
protection formula falling somewhere benv-een the two traditional 
tests: 
[W]e believe that we are no longer limited to the either-or choice 
between the compelling state interest test and the minimal scrutiny 
permitted by the Lindsley-McGowan formula. ... [T]he Supreme 
Court appears to have moved from this rigid dichotomy, sometimes 
described as a "nV'o-tiered" formula, toward a more flexible and 
equitable approach, which permits consideration to be given to 
evidence of the nature of the unequal classification under attack, 
the nature of the rights adversely affected, and the governmental in-
terest urged in support of it. Under this approach the test for applica-
tion of the Equal Protection Clau~e is whether the legislative 
classification is in fact substantially related to the object of the 
statute .... I£ the classification, upon review of facts bearing upon 
the foregoing relevant factors, is shown to have a substantial relation-
ship to a lawful objective and is not void for other reasons, such as 
overbreadth, it will be upheld. I£ not, it denies equal protection.23 
Several recent Supreme Court decisions were cited as authority for 
this new standard of review.24 Also cited was a law review article by 
Professor Gerald Gunther,25 which propounds a model for a new 
equal protection standard that focuses on the degree to which legis-
lative means further legislative ends.26 
As described by the Boraas court, the new standard of review has 
two elements. First, a court should scrutinize the legislative means to 
determine if, based on the actual facts before the court, they further 
the legislative ends. Judges should no longer strain to find a hypo-
thetical set of facts that could conceivably show a rational relationship 
23. 476 F.2d at 814 (emphasis original). 
24. 476 F.2d at 814, citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 
404 U.S. 71 (1971); James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 
715 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972). Judge Timbers cited 
additional decisions in his dissenting opinion. 476 F.2d at 819 n.1 citing Police Dept. 
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
25. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword, In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. R.Ev. 
1 (1972). 
26. This article appears to be the primary source of the explicit standard enunciated 
in Boraas. See text accompanying notes 56-61 infra. In two earlier cases in which Second 
Circuit panels discussed "new equal protection" standards, Professor Gunther's article 
was the chief authority cited. See Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (1973), cert. 
denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S., Jan. 14, 1974); City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 
923, 931 (1973). See also Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 632 n.3, 633 n.8 
(1973). None of these opinions is cited in Boraas. Judge Mansfield does refer to them, 
however, in his reply to Judge Timber's dissent from the denial of a rehearing en bane. 
See 476 F.2d at 828 n.3. 
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between means and ends. The court described the degree to which 
means must relate to ends as "substantial." It is not apparent what 
degree of connection is required or whether there are any objective 
criteria which a court could use to determine whether a substantial 
relationship to a lawful objective exists.27 
The second element is found in the court's statement that "[the 
new approach] ... permits consideration to be given to evidence of 
the nature of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of 
the rights adversely affected, and the governmental interest urged in 
support of it."28 This seems to suggest a balancing or sliding-scale 
approach. The degree of scrutiny of the means chosen would depend 
upon the relative significance attached by a reviewing court to the 
rights allegedly affected and the governmental interest asserted.29 
When challenged by the dissenting opinion,80 however, the majority 
denied that a balancing approach was intended: 
We disagree ·with our Brother Timbers' interpretation of our 
decision as requiring the court to apply a flexible standard based 
upon balancing .... [T]he court is required to determine whether 
the legislative classification in fact (rather than hypothetically) has 
a substantial relationship to lawful objective. That determination of 
necessity requires the court to consider evidence of the nature of the 
classification under attack, the rights adversely affected and the 
governmental interest in support of it.81 
The presence in the case of alleged associational rights may have 
influenced the high degree of scrutiny actually adopted,82 but, as the 
court applied its standard, it is difficult to see exactly how evidence of 
the nature of competing considerations affected the court's ruling 
27. In support of its standard the court cited language from Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 
71, 76 (1971): "'The question presented by this case, then, is whether a difference in the 
sex . of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship 
to a state objective ••• .'" 476 F.2d at 815. The Boraas court's extrapolation from "ra• 
tional" to "substantial" may not be altogether unfounded. See text accompanying notes 
115-16 infra. I 
28. 476 F.2d at 814. 
29. There are hints of support in recent Supreme Court opinions for such a standard. 
See Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur, Co,, 406 
U.S. 164, 172-73 (1972); San Antonio Independent School Dist. v, Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 
98-110 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). See generally Comment, Fundamental Personal 
Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40 U. Cm, L. REv, 807 (1973); Note, 
The Decline and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA, L. 
REv. 1489 (1972). A number of opinions applying strict judicial scrutiny have adopted 
this approach as an aspect of the decision-making process, E.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 
U.S. 23, 30 (1968); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972). 
30. 476 F.2d at 821. 
31. 476 F.2d at 815 n.8 (emphasis original). 
32, Certain of the cases that the Boraas rourt drew on as support for the new equal 
protection test arguably applied a heightened standard of review when possible new 
fundamental rights were present, rather than forthrightly recognizing the right as funda-
mental. See text accompanying notes 160-61 infra. 
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on the substantial relation benveen legislative means and ends, since 
the importance of the competing public and private interests was 
never discussed. 
After describing the new standard, the Boraas court considered 
the merits of the case. The district court had found that the purpose 
of the zoning ordinance was to preserve a legally protectable, affirma-
tive interest of the community in the traditional marriage and in the 
blood-related family unit.83 In the opinion of the appellate court, 
this goal "fail[ ed] to fall within the proper exercise of state police 
power";84 the objective was a "social preference ... hav[ing] n~ 
relevance to public health, safety or welfare ... ,"85 "exclud[ing] from 
the community, without any rational basis, unmarried groups seeking 
to live together .... "86 The court ,then stated that, even assuming 
that "a social predilection in the form of entrenched traditional 
family units"87 was a valid zoning objective, there was no "shred of 
rational support for the means used here to achieve that end,''88 be-
cause "[i]t is not suggested that appellants or unrelated groups func-
tioning as a single housekeeping unit, endanger the health, safety, 
morals or welfare of existing residents of the community."89 
The court then turned to the village's argument that the ordi-
nance could be sustained by looking to traditionally recognized zon-
ing objectives, specifically control of population density, avoidance of 
rent inflation, and prevention of traffic, parking, and noise problems. 
The court readily admitted that these are all legitimate police power 
objectives but found no rational relationship between these goals and 
the ordinance: 
Upon the record before us ... we fail to find a vestige of any such 
support [for these hypothesized objectives]. To theorize that groups 
of unrelated members would have more occupants per house than 
would traditional family groups or that they would price the latter 
33. 476 F.2d at 815. 
34. 476 F.2d at 815. The Supreme Court found that to enhance "family values ••• 
and the blessings of quiet seclusion" is within the state's police power. 42 U.S.L.W. 
at 4477. 
35. 476 F.2d at 815. 
ll6. 476 F.2d at 816. Other courts, however, have held that this is a legitimate gov• 
ernmental goal. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Palo Alto Ten-
ants Union v. Morgan, 321 F. Supp. 908 (N.D. Cal. 1970). . 
The Supreme Court has mentioned the importance of the traditional family unit 
and has sanctioned classifications that affirmatively promote it. See McGowan v. Mary-
land, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The recent case 
of In re Statham, 483 F.2d 436 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 334 (U.S., Nov. 
21, 1973), upheld federal bankruptcy exemptions granted to married but not unmarried 
persons. The court assumed without discussion that protection of the family unit in this 
context was a legitimate statutory objective. 
37. 476 F.2d at 816. 
38. 476 F.2d at 816. 
39. 476 F.2d at 816. 
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out of the market or produce greater parking, noise or traffic prob-
lems, would be rank speculation, unsupported either by evidence or 
by facts that could be judicially noticed.40 
The court did not expressly link this language to its previous 
enunciation of a new standard of review, but the statement that "[t]o 
theorize ... would be rank speculation, unsupported .•. by evidence" 
appears to require that the legislative classification be substantially 
related in fact to the statute's objective; it suggests that a court should 
not hypothesize a set of facts supplying the requisite relationship, as 
is commonly done under the minimal scrutiny test. The court went 
on to quote language by the Supreme Court of Illinois, which, in City 
of Des Plaines v. Trottner,41 considered an identical ordinance: 
"Family groups are mobile today, and not all family units are in-
ternally stable and well-disciplined. Family groups with two or more 
cars are not unfamiliar. And so far as intensity of use is concerned, 
the definition in the present ordinance, with its reference to the 
'respective spouses' of persons related by blood, marriage or adop-
tion, can hardly be regarded as an effective control upon the size of 
family units."42 
This analysis could be fitted into the new standard of review, which 
attempts to determine the factual connection between legislative 
means and ends. It should be noted, however, that such an analysis 
would also be appropriate under the minimal scrutiny test, where 
it could be used to ascertain if a classification is purely arbitrary. 
Up to this point, the Boraas court's analysis accords fairly well 
with its announced standard (although there has been no overt com-
parison of competing interests). But the court apparently did not feel 
that the arguments from Trottner settled the case, because it imme-
diately plunged off in a new direction: It considered whether the or-
dinance was "too sweeping, excessive and over-inclusive" since the 
same goals ( deintensification of land use and of noise, and parking 
and traffic control) could be accomplished by legislative action that 
would avoid discrimination against nonconsanguineous groups.48 
The court explained itself with the following examples:44 A simple 
way of maintaining population density at the level of traditional 
family units would be to regulate the number of bedrooms in a 
dwelling structure. Public and private nuisance laws adequately 
prevent excessive noise by occupants. Rent controls best deter rent 
inflation. Traffic or parking problems can be handled most directly by 
restricting the number of cars per dwelling unit. 
Since the court felt compelled to suggest more efficacious legisla-
40. 476 F.2d, at 816. But see 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477. 
41. 34 III. 2d 432, 216 N.E.2d ll6 (1966). 
42. 476 F.2d at 817, quoting 34 III. 2d at 434, 216 N.E.2d at 119. 
43. 476 F.2d at 817. 
44. 476 F.2d at 817. 
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tive means to accomplish the same ends, it seems to admit that the 
ordinance has at least some rational relationship to concededly valid 
zoning objectives. This concession indicates that the court adopted 
the less onerous means analysis as 'a ground for its decision. 
There are several problems with using a less onerous means analy-
sis. First, it goes beyond the court's avowed standard of determining 
"whether the legislative classification is in fact substantially related 
to the object of the statute." The court's actual reasoning can be used 
to strike down any classification that has a substantial means-end re-
lationship if another classification is in fact more substantially related 
to the end. If the court is using two separate tests,45 the less onerous 
means analysis may swallow the substantially related analysis. 
Second, the less onerous means approach has traditionally been 
reserved for cases involving impingement upon fundamental rights, 
particularly first amendment freedoms.46 The Boraas court had ex-
plicitly stated that it was not ruling on the petitioners' claim. that 
their rights to privacy and association were adversely affected, but it 
cited no authority for applyiIJ.g this approach where fundamental 
rights were not at stake.47 
The court closed its opinion with a brief se~tion stating that "the 
discriminatory classification created by the Belle Terre ordinance 
does not appear to be supported by any rational basis that is consistent 
with permissible zoning objectives."48 This holding leaves the exact 
45. The court did not explicitly state that it was applying a dual standard, although 
it did say that "[i]f the classification, upon review of facts beating upon the foregoing 
relevant factors, is shown to have a substantial relationship to a lawful objective and is 
not void for other reasons, such as overbreadth, it will be upheld." 476 F.2d at 814. (em-
phasis added). 
· However, the tests were treated separately in that no attempt was made to relate the 
less onerous means discussion to the stated substantial relationship test. This could have 
easily been done by finding that, because certain zoning objectives could be accom-
plished by less discriminatory means, the relationship was not substantial. Nor did the 
court attempt to relate the less onerous means discussion to traditional equal protection 
standards by finding that, because certain zoning objectives could be accomplished more 
directly, the classification was arbitrary. The court may have meant to do this implicitly. 
See note 47 infra and text accompanying notes 237-43 infra. A general difficulty with the 
opinion is that the enunciated standard of review is never explicitly linked to the dis-
cussion of the merits. 
46. E.g., United States v. Robel, 289 U.S. 258 (1967); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 
88, 102 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939). See generally Note, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REv. 844 (1970). Certain strict scrutiny 
equal protection decisions have also asked whether less onerous means were available to 
achieve the statutory purpose. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 635, 637 (1969); 
Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 353 (1972). 
47. The only case cited was Kirsch Holding C.o. v. Borough of Manasquan, 59 N.J. 
241, A.2d 513 (1971), discussed in the text accompanying notes 237-41 infra. See 476 F.2d 
at 817. That case struck down a similar zoning ordinance that "preclude[d] so many 
harmless dwelling uses, ••• that [it] must be held to be sweepingly excessive [and] 
legally unreasonable." 59 N.J. at 250-51, 281 A.2d at 518. The New Jersey court con-
cluded that the zoning ordinance was outside the scope of the police power. 
48. 476 F.2d at 818 (emphasis added). 
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standard of review employed in considerable doubt. The language 
would fit within the "traditional equal protection test, but the degree 
of scrutiny employed by the court, particularly in its discussion of 
less onerous means, far exceeds the intensity of review under the old 
equal protection. Nor does the court explain how its bare holding of 
no "rational" r~lationship differs from, is similar to, or encompasses 
the no "substantial relationship" language of its test. 
Judge Timbers dissented. He agreed with the majority that the 
Supreme Court appeared to be moving toward a new standard of 
review·but disagreed ·with some aspects of the majority's test, particu-
larly the statement that "the nature of the rights adversely affected" 
should in part determine the degree of rationality required. 49 He 
stated his view of the applicable standard: 
t 
The recent Supreme Court decisions, in my view, require a judge 
to make only the narrow value judgments needed in evaluating 
means. A legislative classification must contribute substantially to 
the achievement of the state's purpose .... This would indicate that 
· grossly overinclusive or underinclusive classifications should not be 
readily tolerated. Nor should a reviewing court defer to imaginable 
facts that might justify the classification. But account should be 
taken of legislative realities and the need for legislative flexibility. 
In short, a legislature should be able to adopt any means that are 
reasonably effective in achieving a valid legislative end or ends.Go 
_Moving to the merits, Judge Timbers disagreed with the ma-
jority's position that maintenance of the one-family character of the 
village was not a legitimate zoning objective and went on to find the 
legislative means employed "rationally related" to this objective.Gt 
He found it unnecessary, however, to decide the case on this ground 
because the ordinance was rationally related to control of population 
density, avoidance of rent inflation, and prevention of parking, traffic, 
and noise problems, all recognized zoning objectives.112 He viewed the 
majority's discussion, particularly its suggestion of less onerous means, 
as "reminiscent of the 'strict scrutiny' test, which ... is inapplicable 
here. "53 He concluded, "The fact that the means selected by the 
Village may not have been the most efficient or the least intrusive of 
those available is legally immaterial under the means-scrutiny test. 
If the means selected contributes substantially to the end, the equal 
protection clause has not been violated. "54 
The most interesting feature of the Boraas opinion is its declama-
49. For the majority's response, see text accompanying note 31 supra. 
!JO. 4'76 F.2d at 821-22. 
51. 476 F.2d at 823. 
52. 476 F.2d at 823-24. 
53. 476 F.2d at 824. 
54. 476 F.2d at 824. 
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tion of a new equal protection test. The decisions cited by the court 
lend some support to t4e notion of an intermediate equal protection 
standard, 'but subsequently decided cases cast doubt on the vitality 
of any such test. 
II. POSSIBLE .ANTECEDENTS 
A. The Gunther Article 
While the Boraas court cites seven Supreme Court cases as prec-
edent, 55 the language of its standard was drawn from Professor 
Gunther's law review article.56 He describes his new equal protection 
as a 
means-focused, relatively narrow, preferred groundt571 of decision in 
a broad range of cases. Stated most simply, it would have the Court 
take seriously a constitutional requirement that has never been for-
mally abandoned: that legislative means must substantially further 
legislative ends. . . . [E]xtreme deference to imaginable supporting 
facts and conceivable legislative purposes was characteristic of the 
"hands off" attitude of the old equal protection. Putting consistent 
new bite into the old equal protection would mean that the Court 
would be less ·willing to supply justifying rationales by exercising its 
imagination. It would have the Court assess the means in terms of 
legislative purposes that have substantial basis in actuality, not merely 
in conjecture.0s 
So far, the model is by and large equivalent to the stated test in 
Boraas, where the court required a substantial relation between the 
classification and the objective. At one point in the opinion, the court 
55. See note 24 supra. 
56. See note 25 supra. 
57. By "preferred ground" of decision, Gunther means that a court should adopt this 
equal protection test instead of dealing with more difficult issues that might be posed 
by an alternate standard. See Gunther, supra note 25, at 22. See also Bickel, The Su-
preme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtue, 75 HARv. L. R.Ev. 40 (1961); 
Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and Ex-
pediency in Judical Review, 64 CouJM:. L REv. 1, 20-21 (1964). 
Professor Gunther finds a philosophical basis for the new test as a "preferred 
ground" of decision in Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency, 
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949). Justice Jackson noted that the equal pro-
tection clause was to be preferred over the due process clause when dealing with sub-
stantive legislation because invalidation under the due process clause "leaves ungov-
erned and ungovernable conduct which many people find objectionable," while "[i]n• 
vocation of the equal protection clause • • • does not disable any governmental body 
from dealing with the subject at hand." 336 U.S. at 112. It only asks that the legislature 
redraw classifications so as to avoid a discriminatory impact. 
It should be noted, however, that some authorities have questioned the aggressive 
use of the equal protection clause. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND nm 
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Wel-
fare Adjudication, 58 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 555 (1970); Kurland, Egalitarianism· and the War-' 
ren Court, 68 MICH. L R.Ev. 629 (1970). 
58. Gunther, supra note 25, at 20-21. 
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rejected a proposed justification for the ordinance because "[u]pon 
the record before us ... we fail to find a vestige of any such support" 
that would establish a substantial relationship between the proposed 
objectives and the classification.59 The court was unwilling to provide 
its own set of justifying facts, as it might have done under the minimal 
scrutiny test. But Gunther proceeds, 
[T]he strengthened "rationality" scrutiny would curtail the state's 
choice of means far less severely than the [strict scrutiny] approach. 
The Warren Court's strict scrutiny repeatedly asked whether the 
means were "necessary" and whether "less drastic means" were 
available to achieve the statutory purpose .... The more modest in-
terventionism •.. would permit the state to select any means that 
substantially furthered the legislative purpose.~0 
The Boraas majority's approach is not consistent with this formula-
tion, for a discussion of less onerous means occupied a major part 
of that opinion. The court also did not reply to the dissent's charge, 
echoing Gunther, that the less onerous means test smacked of the 
very strict scrutiny approach that the majority had ostensibly re-
jected. 61 Obviously, the majority parted company with Professor 
Gunther on this point. 
In general, Professor Gunther's model seems more restrained 
than the review adopted in Boraas. His test differs from the minimal 
scrutiny standard chiefly in rejecting an utterly deferential attitude 
toward legislative classifications. Boraas, while adopting much of the 
wording of Gunther's model, engaged in much broader review. Ob-
jectives, as well as means, were scrutinized, and a whole series of 
alternate approaches were suggested. Nor does Gunther mention 
judicial weighing of the relative importance of personal rights and 
legislative interests as an aspect of decision-making under the test. 
The source of the court's standard apparently lies elsewhere. 
B. The Cases Cited by the Boraas Court 
The Supreme Court cases cited in Boraas were ostensibly decided 
under the minimal scrutiny test, and none contains an overt formula-
tion of a new test. While most of the cases can be read as fitting into 
traditional patterns of decision, several of the cases arguably reach 
results, and contain analysis, reflecting a middle-ground equal pro-
tection review. 
In Jackson v. Indiana,62 the Court unanimously ruled that the 
59. 476 F.2d at 816. The court did not rest its decision on the lack of an evidentiary 
foundation, for it immediately proceeded to analyze the proposed objectives, first in 
terms of arbitrariness of classification, and then in regard to possible utilization of less 
onerous means. 
60. Gunther, supra note 25, at 21. 
61. 476 F.2d at 824; Gunther, supra note 25, at 21. 
62. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
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Indiana pretrial commitment procedures for mentally incompetent 
criminal defendants violated the equal protection clause. Jackson, 
a mentally defective deaf mute with the mental level of a preschool 
child, had been charged with two robberies, but before his trial the 
trial court had set in motion the Indiana procedures for determining 
his competence to stand trial. After a competency hearing the court 
found that Jackson could not understand his defense and ordered 
him committed until certified sane. Indiana's statutory commitment 
procedures for noncriminals contained more stringent commitment 
standards and more lenient release standards than those adopted for 
incompetent criminal defendants like Jackson. The state tried to 
justify the more stringent safeguards for noncriminals by arguing that 
Jackson's commitment was only temporary, for he could stand tJ::ial 
when sane, while commitment of noncriminal "feeble-minded" per-
sons was for an indefinite period. The Supreme Court agreed that, 
if the state's premise was correct, there might be a valid distinction, 
but the Court cited medical testimony from the record63 to the effect 
that it was unlikely that Jackson's condition would ever improve. 
Thus, the duration of his commitment was indeterminate, exactly 
like commitment for noncriminal mental incompetents. . 
Willingness to look to the record to ascertain if there is a factual 
basis for differing treatment of classes is a hallmark of the equal pro-
tection test described in Boraas. Even under minimal scrutiny, how-
ever, a court will look to the record where suppositions are conclu-
sively provable in this way, before it accepts a hypothetical argument 
that may be true in some cases but is not in the case under considera-
tion. 04 
Once the Jackson Court had determined that mentally incom-
petent criminal defendants were subjected to different commitment 
standards than noncriminal mental defectives, the case was decided 
on the basis of precedent. Baxstrom v. Herold65 had held that a state 
prisoner who was civilly committed at the conclusion of his prison 
term solely on the finding of a judge was denied equal protection in 
that he was not allowed the jury trial provided to all others persons 
civilly committed. The state was forbidden to withold from one class 
the procedural protections available to all others. The Jackson Court 
reasoned that "[i]f criminal conviction and imposition of sentence 
are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection 
against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all 
others, the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice."66 
63. 406 U.S. at '725-26. 
64. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938): "[T]he exis-
tence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, ••• unless in the 
light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such character as to preclude 
the assumption that it rests .upon some rational basis.'' 
65. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
66. 406 U.S. at 724. 
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Ba::strom had been a "no rational basis" decision, and the differences 
in procedure in that case were termed capricious.67 Thus, although 
. a tendency toward increased judicial reliance on the factual basis for 
the differing treatment of similarly situated groups is illustrated by 
Jackson, notably in its rejection of the argument that Jackson was 
only committed "until sane," the case is merely an extension of 
Baxstrom, a minimal scrutiny case that contains none of the "new 
equal protection" tendencies. In itself, Jackson hardly portends a new 
doctrinal trend. 68 
Humphrey v. Cady69 involved facts similar to Jackson. Humphrey 
had been convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor 
and, in lieu of a jail sentence, had bten committed to a "sex deviate 
facility" pursuant to the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act. Although the 
maximum sentence for his crime was one year, Humphrey's confine-
ment was potentially indefinite, as the state could petition for five-
year renewals of commitment. Under Wisconsin's mental health 
statute jury determinations precede commitment; no opportunity 
for a jury trial was allowed under the state's Sex Crimes Act. The 
Court's finding that commitment for treatment under both statutes 
involved precisely the same kind of determinations squarely posed 
the question raised in Baxstrom of what justification the state could 
provide for the differing treatment of seemingly identically situated 
classes. The case was remanded for an evidentiary hearing, partly to 
determine if there was any basis for the differing procedures, such as 
a special characteristic of sex offenders that might render a jury deter-
mination inappropriate.70 Since the Court did not rule on the possible 
grounds for justifying the disparate treatment under the two statutes, 
there is no opportunity to see what degree of factual connection 
would have been required to explain the divergent procedures. Thus, 
the case does not directly consider whether there was a substantial 
relationship in fact between legislative classification and objective. 
However, the Court's refusal to hypothesize a situation where 
there would be a rational distinction between sex offenders and other 
offenders was striking. The minimal scrutiny standard would seem 
to require such judicial hypothesizing.11 The remand to determine if 
a possible distinction exists tends to support the Boraas position that 
factual grounds should support the classification and suggests that 
something more than the rational basis test was applied in Humphrey. 
67. 383 U.S. at 115. 
68. The Court also found procedural due process violations. Professor Gunther notes 
an "avoidance principle" at work in Jackson, in that basing the decision on equal pro-
tection grounds made it unnecessary for the Court to rule on petitioner's claim that 
detention of a sick individual violated the eighth amendment. See Gunther, supra note 
25, at 28. 
69. 405 U.S. 504 (1972). 
70. 405 U.S. at 512. 
71. See text accompanying note 13 supra. 
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Police Department v; Mosley72 involved a city ordinance prohibi-
ting picketing within 150 feet of a school building. The ordinance 
excepted peaceful labor picketing from the ban. The Court seized 
on the distinction between labor. picketing and all other picketing 
and found the ordinance unconstitutional on equal protection 
grounds. The Court noted, however, that "tlre equal protection claim 
in this case [was] closely intertwined with First Amendment in-
terests,"78 and much of Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court dealt 
with these interests. Agreeing that a state can regulate the time, place, 
and manner of picketing, he noted that the ordinance attempted to 
regulate picketing according to the content of the message since the 
exception to the regulation-labor picketing-differed from other 
picketing only on the basis of the subject matter of the picket signs. 
This was found unconstitutional: "[A]bove all else, the First Amend-
ment means that government has no power to restrict expression 
because of its message, its ideas, its,subject matter, or its content."74 
Justice Marshall returned to equal protection analysis only after 
virtually deciding the case on first amendment grounds. At the outset 
of the opinion he had said, "As in all equal protection cases ... the 
crucial question is whether there is- an appropriate governmental in-
terest suitably furthered by the differential treatment,"75 but after 
the first amendment discussion he modified the standard, saying that 
"there may be sufficie:p.t regulatory interests justifying selective ex-
clusions or distinctions among pickets. . . . But these justifications 
for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scruti-
nized. Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within 
the protection of the First Amendment, . . . discriminations among 
pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental in-
terest."76 This language conforms, by and large, to the rubric of the 
compelling interest test, which, indeed, is appropriate in the Mosley 
situation, where a fundamental right was being impinged upon by 
state regulation.77 
Justice Marshall dismissed the city's purported justifications rather 
preemptorily. The city had argued that the purpose of the ordinance 
was to prevent school disruptions, but the Court observed that peace-
ful labor picketing and peaceful nonlabor picketing are equally 
72. 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
73. 408 U.S. at 95. 
74. 408 U.S. at 95, citing, inter alia, Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); New 
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The case of Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 
U.S. 551 (1972), in which the Court drew a distinction between picketing in a labor 
conte.'Ct and all other picketing on private property, was not mentioned. 
75. 408 U.S. at 95. 
76. 408 U.S. 98-99. 
77. A right is fundamental for equal protection purposes if it is "explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution." Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School 
Dist., 411 U.S. I, 33-34 (1973). 
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nondisruptive.78 The Court disposed of the further argument that 
nonlabor picketing as a class tended to be more violence-prone than 
labor picketing by saying that, where freedom of expression was at 
stake, such value judgments had to be made on an "individualized 
basis," not in the form of broad classifications.70 
Mosley engages in extensive scrutiny; after all, allowing one type 
of picketing that could conceivably be deemed peculiarly nondis-
tracting does have some relation to the admittedly legitimate ob-
jective of preventing school disruption. However, as pointed out 
above, such a degree of scrutiny is justifiable because a fundamental 
interest protected by the first amendment was at stake. 
While most of the bpinion dealt with the first amendment aspects 
of the case, the broad statement that "[i]n all cases the crucial question 
is whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably 
furthered by the differential treatment"80 is noteworthy from an equal 
protection standpoint, for it avoids any reference to the minimal 
scrutiny/strict scrutiny dichotomy. '.J'his omission may indicate that 
the opinion could be analyzed as taking a sliding-scale approach, 
rather than applying strict scrutiny, as it at first appears to do.81 Jus-
tice Marshall's language may be the source of the Boraas majority's 
statement that "consideration [is] to be given to evidence of the nature 
of the unequal classification under attack, the nature of the rights ad- . 
- versely affected, and the governmental interest urged in support of 
it,"82 although the Boraas court explicitly denied adopting a sliding-
scale approach. However, Mosley, read either as a strict scrutiny case 
or as an attempt to formulate a broad doctrine applicable in all equal 
protection cases, does not adopt a third, intermediate standard of re-
view. 
In Weberv. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.83 Justice Powell, writing 
for eight members of the Court, found that Louisiana's denial of 
equal recovery rights under state workmen's compensation law to 
unacknowledged, dependent, illegitimate children denied these chil-
dren equal protection of the law. In language somewhat similar to 
that in Mosley, the Court delivered a broad summation of equal 
protection theory: 
The tests to determine the validity of state statutes under the Equal 
Protection Clause have been variously expressed, but this Court 
78. 408 U.S. at 100. 
79. 408 U.S. at 100-01. 
80. See text accompanying note 75 supra. 
81. Such an approach is advocated in a number of Justice Marshall's dissenting opin-
ions. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973): 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970). See also Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 
330, 335 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting); note 197 infra. 
82. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
83. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
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requires, at a minimum, that a statutory classification bear some ra-
tional relationship to a legitimate state purpose .... Though the 
latitude given state economic and social regulation is necessarily 
broad, when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and 
fundamental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter' scrutiny . 
. . . The essential inquiry in all of the foregoing cases is, however, 
inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does the classifi-
cation promote? What fundamental personal rights might the classi-
fication endanger?B4 
This passage can be read as an attempt to formulate an equal pro-
tection test applicable in all cases. The degree of judicial scrutiny 
would be determined by balancing the importance of the "legitimate 
state interest" that is allegedly promoted ·with the allegedly endan-
gered "fundamental personal rights." The fact that the Court did 
not explicitly adopt a two-tiered approach supports the notion that the 
passage describes a single, over-arching test. However, an equally 
possible reading is to consider the quotation to be a broad restate-
ment of the bifurcated equal protection approach. Minimal and strict 
scrutiny cases are separately demarcated, and the reference to an "in-
evitable inquiry" involving state interests and fundamental personal 
rights can be explained in traditional terms: The nature of the per-
sonal right involved is investigated to determine the proper tier, and 
the state interest is investigated in applying either test. Even assum-
ing the first reading to be accurate, however, the balancing standard 
described in Weber differs markedly from the test employed in 
Boraas, for it emphasizes the scrutiny of ends rather than of means 
so that the importance of the state interest is the pivotal factor in 
determining the level of review. , 
The Weber Court's application of its test seemed to suggest that 
minimal scrutiny was adopted. The Court recognized legitimate state 
interests in "protecting legitimate family relationships"85 and in mini-
mizing potentially difficult proof problems under Louisiana's Work-
men's Compensation Act86 but stated that the discriminatory 
classification did not promote either objective: "[It cannot] be 
thought here that persons will shun illicit relations because the off-
spring may not one day reap the benefits of workmen's compensation . 
. . . Our decision ... will not expand claimants for workmen's com-
pensation beyond tliose in a direct blood and dependency relationship 
·with the deceased .... "87 But the Coui:t's analysis concludes, "The 
inferior classification of dependent unacknowledged illegitimates 
bears, in this instance, no significant relationship to. those recognized 
84. 406 U.S. at 172-73. 
85. 406 U.S. at 173. 
86. 406 U.S. at 174. 
87. 406 U.S. at 173-75. 
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purposes of recovery which workmen's compensation statutes com-
mendably serve."88 
The Court's reference to a significant, rather than a rational, rela-
tionship indicates that it was applying some form of heightened re-
view89 and seems to s.uggest a particular sensitivity to illegitimacy as a 
classification. This is not surprising, since illegitimacy bears many of 
the hallmarks-including group stigmatization, a history of discrimi-
nation, and ready identifiability-of recognized suspect classifica• 
tions.90 The Weber Court seemed to recognize the suspect nature of 
the class when it noted that "imposing disabilities on the illegitimate 
child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should bear some relationship to individual responsibility .... "01 The 
Court, in a later case,92 appeared to reaffirm the view that illegitimacy 
is a 'suspect classification when it stated with regard to paternal sup• 
port that "[w ]e therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially 
enforceable right on behalf of children to needed support from their 
natural fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for 
denying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural 
father has not married its mother."03 Thus, Weber can best be ex-
plained as the judicial recognition of illegitimacy as a suspect classifi-
cation and, therefore, may not offer much support for the Boraas test. 
Both Judge Timbers, in his dissent in Boraas, and Professor 
Gunther consider James v. Strange94 to be the best example of the 
new equal protection.05 James found Kansas' method of recouping 
legal defense fees expended for indigent defendants to be unconsti• 
tutional. Under the recoupment procedure, the former defendant was 
denied certain exemptions, including protection from wage garnish-
ments, available to all other civil debtors.00 The Court, quoting from 
Rinaldi v. Yeager, 97 stated that 
the Equal Protection Clause "imposes a requirement of some ra-
tionality in the nature of the class singled out." ... This requirement 
88. 406 U.S. at 175 (emphasis added). 
89. The Court also rejected one state justification because "it is not compelling in a 
statutory compensation scheme where dependency on the deceased is a prerequisite to 
anyone's-recovery ••.• " 406 U.S. at 173 (emphasis added). 
90. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage as a suspect class); 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (race as a suspect class); Oyama v. California, 
332 U.S. 633 (1948) (ancestry as a suspect class). 
91. 406 U.S. at 175. 
92. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam). 
93. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam). 
94. 407 U.S. 128 (1972). 
95. See 476 F.2d at 820; Gunther, supra note 25, at 33. 
96. The Court has recently shown a notable solicitude in regard to limiting the 
more draconian effects of creditor remedies. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); 
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). 
97. 384 U.S. 305 (1966). 
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is lacking where, as in the instant case, the State has subjected in-
digent defendants to such discriminatory conditions of repayments . 
• . . [T]o impose these harsh conditions on a class of debtors who were 
provided counsel as required by the Constitution is to practice . . . 
a discrimination which the Equal Protection Clause proscribes.98 
' 
The Court agreed that the state had a legitimate interest in regaining 
the expended funds99 but cited no state argument in support of the 
distinction between the two classes of debtors. 
It is important to note that the Court departed from traditional 
minimal scrutiny review in that it did not feel C(?mpelled to supply a 
justification.100 The Court might have, for instance, suggested that 
indigent criminal defendants , are arguably more prone to, conceal 
assets than are civil debtors and, hence, should not receive the benefits 
of the exemption statutes. While James drew on Rinaldi v. Yeager, 
a minimal scrutiny decision that held that a New Jersey statute 
requiring only those indigent defendants who were sentenced, to 
prison terms to reimburse the state for the cost of transcripts on ap-
peal, in Rinaldi, unlike James, the Court considered a series of hypo-
thetical legislative purposes before striking down the classification, as 
having no rational relationship to any proposed objective.101 The 
level of review in James is thus more stp.ngent than conventio,nal 
minimal scrutiny. 
James also illustrates Gunther's "preferred ground" ~pproach.102 
The district court had held the Kansas statute invalid as placing an 
impermissible burden on the constitutionally guaranteed right to 
counseI.103 By deciding the case on equal protection grounds, the 
Court avoided the difficult question of the constitutional valiility of 
any state recoupment procedure.104 · 
Professor Gunther comments on the case: 
Justice Powell perceived the readily apparent dissimilarity between 
indigent defendants and other judgment debtors ·with respect to 
exemptions; encountered no articulated state ground for the differ-
ence; refused to strain his imagination to supply that missing 
explanation; and accordingly found that the "some rationality" re-
quirement had not been met. Justice Powell was plainly unwilling 
98. 407 U.S. at 140-41, quoting 384 U.S. at 308-09. 
99. 407 U.S. at 141. 
100. See text accompanying note 13 supra. 
101. 384 U.S. at 309-10. 
102. See note 57 supra. 
103. Strange v. James, 323 F. Supp. 1230 (D. Kan. 1971) (three-judge court). 
104. The right to counsel in criminal cases is guaranteed by Gideon v. Wainwright, 
372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Several other decisions 
have removed financial barriers that faced indigents involved in the criminal process. 
See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (right to state-supplied transcript on crimi-
nal appeal). 
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to consider all the conceivable state justifications .... His invalida-
tion for lack of an offered explanation conformed to the less 
deferential stance suggested by the model.10u 
This seems to indicate that the critical difference between James, or 
Gunther's view of James, and the old equal protection is the lack of 
inclination to supply a judicially hypothesized rationale, really a 
"less deferential stance." Since the Boraas majority went far beyond 
this standard in their questioning of the degree of means-end connec-
tion and their discussion of less onerous means, James does not settle 
the question of the authority for Boraas.106 
The two cases principally relied upon by the Boraas majority were 
Reed v. Reed1°7 and Eisenstadt v. Baird.108 Reed held unconstitu-
tional an Idaho probate provision that gave men a mandatory prefer-
ence over women when persons of the same priority class applied for 
appointment to administer a decedent's estate. The statutory objective 
was probate simplification, an admittedly legitimate objective.100 
Using language quoted in both Boraas and Baird,110 the Court stated: 
A classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest 
upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation 
to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
'cumstanced shall be treated alike." •.. The question presented by 
this case, then, is whether a difference in the sex of competing ap• 
plicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship 
to a state objective that is sought to be advanced by [the statute].111 
Eliminating a class of applicants for letters of adminstration would 
seem to simplify probate procedure, but the Court decided that "[t]o 
give a mandatory preference to members of either sex ... is to make 
the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal 
Protection Clause ... :•112 
· The Boraas court read this language as requiring something more 
105. Gunther, supra note 25, at 33. 
106. The Boraas court did comment that "[i]f some or all of these hypothesized ob• 
jectives [such as rent control, use intensity, and traffic control] were supportable, some 
form of such ordinance might conceivably be upheld as a valid exercise of state police 
power. Upon the record before us, however, we fail to find a vestige of any such sup• 
port." 476 F.2d at 816. Taken alone, this appears to be an example of the Gunther 
standard, under which a court will not be bound to theorize a permissible objective, 
But the Boraas court immediately began to discuss inadequate links between means and 
ends, thus making it quite unclear whether the element unsupported by the record was 
the hypothesized objective or the means-end link. 
107. 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
108. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
109. 404 U.S. at 76. . 
HO. 405 U.S. at 447; 476 F.2d at 814·15. 
lll. 404 U.S. at 76, quoting F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 
(1920), 
112. 404 U.S. at 76. 
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stringent than a mere rational relationship between means and ends, 
in spite of Reed's announced rational relationship requirement. Both 
the Boraas dissent and Professor Gunther thought that Reed reflected 
a special suspicion of sex classifications.118 Rather than considering the 
Reed result as a manifestation of increased judicial scrutiny, however, 
it might be fruitful to focus on the Court's statement that the classifi-
cation was "arbitrary." If the Idaho statute had given a mandatory 
preference to all persons under five feet, seven inches tall, the stat-
utory objective of simplifying probate procedures would be advanced 
in the same way as by giving preferred status to men, for in either case 
a class of applicants would be eliminated. Yet a classification based on 
height would certainly be struck down as arbitrary. The key is that, 
not only must there be a rational means-end relationship, but also the 
intrinsic characteristic of the class must bear some relationship to the 
proposed statutory objective.114 Thus, Reed can be read as focusing, 
in traditional equal protection fashion, on the second step of this 
two-step inquiry, the rational basis for the differing treatment of 
similarly situated groups. 
However, the case can be read to support the heightened review 
found in Boraas. The Court in Reed took no notice of the argument, 
put fonvard in respondent's brief,115 that men are likely to have more 
business experience than women and thus would make more suitable 
executors. The Court's failure to accept this argument might indicate 
that it still found no rational basis for the classification. But it is also 
possible that, since not every woman would have less business ex-
perience than every man, the relationship between the classification 
and the objective was not considered rational enough or, as worded in 
Boraas, substantial enough to pass constit~tional muster. This ap-
113. 476 F.2d at 820 (Timbers, J.); Gunther, supra note 25, at 34. Justice Marshall, 
dissenting in Rodrigue:, suggested that classifications based on factors, such as race or 
illegitimacy, that are totally beyond an individual's control should be considered in-
herently suspect. 411 U.S. at 108-09. See the discussion at text accompanying notes 119-
22 infra. 
114. See De:velopments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at 1082-83. See 
also Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) ("The inferior classification 
of illegitimates bears ••• no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of re-
covery (served by workmen's compensation statutes]."); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. 
Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897), 
This approach also comports with the analysis of Professors Tussman and ten Broek, 
supra note 13, at 343-53. Their explication began with the proposition that "[a] reason-
able classification is one which includes all persons who are similarly situated with re-
spect to the purpose of the law" and excludes all others. Id. at 346. The. analysis of a 
legislative classification would thus involve the following steps: (1) identification of the 
purpose of the law; (2) determination of the ideal disadvantaged class-ideal in the 
sense that it contains all those similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law, 
and no others; (3) comparison of the legislative classification with the ideal class; and 
(4) determination of the permissible degree of deviation from the ideal. 
115. See Brief for Appellee at 12. 
116. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra. 
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proach would be quite similar to that taken in Boraas, where the 
court noted that not every nonrelated group caused additional traffic, 
noise, or rent-inflatipn.116 This mode of reasoning, however, is not 
explicit in Reed,117 and later cases indicate the Court might not be 
disposed to read Reed in this way.118 
Four justices, in a subsequent case, read Reed as applying the 
strict scrutiny test. In Frontiero v. Richardson119 the Court ruled on 
• differing statutory treatment of men and women in the armed services 
who attempted to obtain increased quarters allowances and medical 
and dental benefits for themselves and their dependent spouses. Wives 
of uniformed men were presumed dependent, while husbands of 
unifon;ned women were not. The differing treatment was found 
unconstitutional, and four members of the Court, viewing Reed as a 
• strict scrutiny opinion, held that classifications based on sex were 
inherently suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny.120 The 
plurality felt that the respondent's argument in Reed-that men could 
legitimately be presumed to be better administrators than women 
because they had more business experience-was enough to satisfy the 
rational basis test. Since the Court had found a violation of the equal 
protection clause, the argument went, strict judicial scrutiny must 
have been tacitly applied.121 
This assumption that an equal protection case must be decided 
under either the rational basis test or the strict scrutiny test involves 
a certain amount of judicial pushing-under-the-rug of awkward 
elements that do not easily fit into either tier. For instance, the 
Frontiero plurality did not mention the Reed Court's failure to ad-
dress the inherent suspectness of sex classifications. If the case is not 
117. Noteworthy in Reed is the Court's assumption of arbitrariness in the face of the 
ignored rational distinction between men and women-specifically, the greater business 
experience of men. A like assumption of similarity of situation occurred in James, where 
the Court assumed without discussion that indigent criminal defendants are not more 
prone to conceal assets than are civil debtors. See text following note 100 supra, Profes• 
sor Gunther's, and Boraas's, requirement that some factual demonstration be made 
might be lurking here, for the failure of the government to show grounds of distinction 
could explain the brusque assumption by each Court that the classifications were arbi-
trary. 
118. A number of recent cases have also questioned whether the goal of administra• 
tive convenience should be afforded legitimate status in every case. These cases found 
constitutional violations even though the state could show some rational basis between 
the classification and the objective of administrative convenience. See Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 
U.S. 645 (1972). 
The lack of deference shown in Reed to the state's objective of facilitating probate 
administration could be explained by the Court's downgrading of this one particular 
objective. This approach would not be available in Boraas, where traditional zoning ob• 
jectives were propounded. 
119. 4ll U.S. 677 (1973). 
120. 411 U.S. at 688. 
121. 411 U.S. at 682-84. 
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to be forced into a mold, it is at least arguable that Reed applied some 
sort of intermediate standard of review. The recognition of an emerg-
ing invidious classification could justify the heightened scrutiny.122 
Although the Frontiero plurality interpreted Reed as a compel-
ling interest case, this does not alter the fact that the Court in ~eed 
was willing to employ a review stronger than the ration:µ relationship 
standard, yet was not ·willing to employ strict judicial scrutiny. There-
fore, Reed arguably applies a form of intermediate review and lendsv 
support to Boraas. 
At issue in Eisenstadt v. Baird123 was a Massachusetts statute that 
made it a crime for anyone to dispense contraceptives to unmarried 
persons. Physicians and pharmacists were permitted to dispense con-
traceptives to married persons, and the statute had been construed to 
permit anyone to dispense contraceptives to married or unmarried 
persons for the purpose of preventing disease. The Court found the 
statute unconstitutional.124 The majority opinion allegedly used 
minimal scrutiny and posited the test in these terms: " 'The Equal 
Protection Clause . . . den[ies] to States the power to legislate that 
different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into 
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the ob-
jective of that statute.' "125 The Court then described the issue as 
"whether there is some ground of difference that rationally explains 
the different treatment accorded married and unmarried persons 
under [the statute]."126 
The first goal considered by the Court was the discouragement of 
premarital sexual activity. The majority found that the statute had 
"at best a marginal relation" to this objective because it allowed 
unmarried people to obtain contraceptives if they were used to pre-
vent disease. Also, married persons could obtain contraceptives to 
engage in sexual activity with unmarried persons. The slight effect 
on premarital sexual activity plus the fact that fornication was already 
a misdemeanor led the Court to conclude that deterrence of pre-
marital sex was not the statutory objective.127 
122, Weber also arguably fits this pattern, for illegitimacy appears to have been 
held to be a suspect classification in Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (per curiam), 
123, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), The case is discussed in Note, Legislative Purpose, Rational• 
ity, and Equal Protection, 82 YALE L.J. 123, 124-28 (1972), 
124. There were a variety of opinions explaining the result. Justice Brennan's ma-
jority opinion, which voided the statute on equal protection grounds, drew the support 
of Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Stewart. Justice Douglas also wrote a concurring 
opinion based on the first amendment, and Justices White and Blackmun concurred on 
the ground that the statute impinged on the fundamental right of marital privacy with-
out an adequate state interest being shown. Chief Justice Burger dissented, and Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist did not participate. 
125. 405 U.S. at 447, quoting Reed, 404 U.S. at 75-76, 
126. 405 U.S. at 447. 
127, 405 U.S. at 450, 
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The majority opinion then rejected a second possible purpose, 
the state's desire to regulate the distribution of potentially dangerous 
drugs and devices. The opinion questioned the danger presented by 
the use of certain contraceptives128 but found that, even assuming 
that contraceptives were dangerous enough to require a physician's 
prescription, the need for such a requirement was equally great for 
married and unmarried persons.129 The exclusion of unmarried 
persons from the benefits of a physician's help in obtaining contra-
ceptives, the majority's lack of belief that the "legislature suddenly 
reversed its field and developed an interest in health" after having a 
different purpose for similar prior legislation,130 and the fact that 
existing federal and state legislation regulated the distribution of 
harmful drugs131 led the Court to the conclusion that the regulation 
of potentially harmful drugs was not the object of the statute.182 
The Court then considered its own theory as to the purpose of the 
Iegislation:133 an outright ban on the use of contraceptives to the 
extent permitted by Griswold v. Connecticut.134 Under Griswold a 
ban on giving contraceptives to married persons is impermissible. 
Baird stated that if the state attempted to provide that married persons 
could receive contraceptives and unmarried persons could not, "[i]n 
each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would be identical, and 
the underinclusion would be invidious."130 Thus, the Court found 
that the legislation could have been passed to further this impermis-
128. 405 U.S. at 451 n.9. In his concurring opinion, Justice White, while finding that 
the state's purported objective of limiting the channels of distribution of potentially 
dangerous commodities was entirely legitimate, voted to reverse the conviction because 
there was no evidence in the record that the particular contraceptive in question, a 
packet of vaginal foam, was dangerous, 405 U.S. at 464. 
Justice White admitted a "general reluctance to question a State's judgment on mat-
ters of public health," 405 U.S. 'at 463, but went on: "Due regard for protecting con• 
stitutional rights requires that the record contain evidence that a restriction on distribu-
tion of vaginal foam is essential to achieve the statutory purpose •••• " 405 U.S. at 464. 
The constitutional right involved was the right of marital privacy found in Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Justice White believed that the Griswold right was rele-
vant to the present case because the offense prohibited by the statute was distribution 
of contraceptives by an unlicensed person to either married or unmarried persons. 405 
U.S. at 462. Since the prohibition on the distribution of harmless contraceptives to 
married persons violated Griswold, and the record contained no evidence to show 
whether the recipient in Baird was married or unmarried, the factual inquiry into the 
potential harmfulness of the distributed contraceptive was warranted so that a constitu-
tional right would not be unduly burdened. Thus, Justice White applied the strict scru-
tiny test to reach the same result as the majority. 
129. 405 U.S. at 450. 
130. 405 U.S. at 450, citing Baird v. Eisenstadt, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401 (1st Cir. 1970). 
131. 405 U.S. at 452. 
132. 405 U.S. at 452. 
133. 405 U.S. at 452-54. 
134. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
135. 405 U.S. at 454. 
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sible objective, but that if this were the objective the law would vio-
late the equal protection clause. 
The opinion contains some elements of the Boraas version of the 
new equal protection test;136 little, if any, deference is paid to the 
avowed legislative .objective, and the level of review is certainly 
greater than under the minimal scrutiny standard. But the scrutiny 
in Baird is largely directed at the legislative objective, not at the 
means of achieving it. Two explicit objectives are rejected, and the 
Court found an imputed objective impermissible, an approach at vari-
ance with the Gunther equal protection, which theoretically con-
siders only those objectives on the record before the court. This in-
tense examination of legislative objectives and searching for unstated 
legislative purposes is a salient characteristic of the strict scrutiny ap-
proach.187 It is true that no fundamental interest was said to be at 
stake in Baird, but much of the tortuous analysis in the majority 
opinion seems to be an attempt to avoid deciding the case on Griswold 
grounds.188 Moreover, the Court's finding of no rational relation-
ship139 is also open to criticism, since parts of the statute were argu-
ably related (the Court agreed that at least a "marginal relation" 
existed140) to the two objectives suggested by the state.141 Thus, while 
the degree of review in Baird is, quite intense, the review conforms 
inexactly ·with both Boraas and Gunther in that the main thrust of 
the opinion is directed toward uncovering the actual pun,ose of the 
Massachusetts legislature, rather than toward determinin'g if the dif-
ferent treatment of married and unmarried persons is in fact related 
to a valid public purpose.142 
136. The unwillingness to allow a permissible distinction between married and un-
married people may bear tangentially on whether a municipality can affirmatively favor 
a family group in its zoning legislation. But see note 36 supra. , 
137. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972); Griffin v. County School Bd., 
377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964). 
138. In dicta the majority pointed the way to an extension of Griswold: 
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the mari-
tal relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind 
and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate 
intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the 
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
mental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision 
whether to bear or beget a child. 
405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis original). See 405· U.S. at 447 n.7. 
139. 405 U.S. at 454-55. 
140. 405 U.S. at 448. 
141. The Court's procedure has been characterized as a "divide and conquer" analy-
tic technique. If the Court had not separated legislative goals, but had considered an 
over-all legislative goal encompassing both of the objectives considered by the Court, 
the finding that there was no rational relationship bet:111een the goals and and the statute 
would have been much more difficult to make. Note, supra note 123, at 124-28. 
142. If the Baird technique had been applied in Boraas, the court would have re-
jected various statutory objectives as not credible because the blood-related classifica• 
tion was not closely enough related to the suggested objective or because laws already 
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It is also possible to view Baird as supporting some type of middle-
ground equal protection review. It could be argued that when there 
is an emerging fundamental right under adjudication-a right that 
the Court is unwilling at this point to designate as fundamental but 
that has the characteristics of previously recognized fundamental 
rights-the Court will begin stretching the rational basis test, In 
Baird, this right would be the possible extension of the Griswold 
rights of marital privacy and association to protect unmarried indi-
,viduals. Following this idea, it could be argued that the Baird Court, 
faced with a right of possible constitutional proportions but unwill-
ing to recognize it as such by overtly applying the compelling interest 
test, paid less heed to conceivable rational relationships than is cus-
tomary under the minimal scrutiny standard. The Court's examina• 
tion of legislative objectives, at least to the extent of trying to deter-
mine the actual objective of the legislation, and its refusal to defer to 
the normally sacrosanct legislative goal of public health148 are both 
techniques foreign to minimal scrutiny. 
The opinion also mirrored Reed and James in ignoring conceiv-
able grounds for distinguishing between seemingly similarly situated 
groups. The Court stated that denial of contraceptive distribution to 
unmarried persons in order to salvage so much of the state's morality 
code as Griswold would allow would violate the equal protection 
clause because "[i]n each case the evil, as perceived by the State, would 
be identical, and the underinclusion would be invidious."144 In other 
words, the Court assumed that no fair ground of distinction between 
married and unmarried persons was possible here. As will be dis-
cussed, 145 this failure to discuss possible justifications runs through 
existed to accomplish the same purposes. Then it would have formulated its own notion 
as to the village's objective-for instance, a desire to keep college students out of the 
·community. Such an objective would not advance any legitimate police power purpose 
and so would violate the equal protection clause. Of course, this analysis was not 
adopted in Boraas. Indeed, the court suggested legislation that could be passed to ac-
complish the same zoning objectives, a reverse of the Baird approach. 
The Baird approach does not take into account a line of cases dating back to Fletcher 
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 129, 131 (1810), in which the Supreme Court has main-
tained that a statute cannot be invalidated merely because the legislature's action was 
motivated by impermissible considerations. An exception has been found in cases in-
volving unstated racially discriminatory objectives. See, e.g., Griffin v. County School Bd,, 
377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 346-47 (1960). But see 
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971). 
Some very able commentators have suggested, however, that courts have carried their 
refusal to examine official purposes to an undesirable extreme. See Brest, Palmer v. 
Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 
SUP. CT. REv. 95; Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970). 
143. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
144. 405 U.S. at 454. 
145. See text accompanying notes 157-61 infra. 
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the precedents cited by the Boraas court, and may well form the basis 
for an intermediate standard of equal protection review. 
C. Observations on the Cases Cited in Boraas 
It is difficult to generalize about the group of cases cited as prece-
dent in Boraas. The cases do not forthrightly enunciate any doctrinal 
shift. Even assuming some emerging new standard, the most obvious 
feature shared by the cases is the Court's willingness to use the equal 
protection clause as a vehicle for avoiding more controversial ra-
tionales.146 As a result, the minimal scrutiny test has been applied 
with a bit more bite and with a less quiescent attitude toward legisla-
tive goals. It should be noted, ho1vever, that the Court gave no indica-
tion of when it would employ this heightened scrutiny,147 and in 
other cases from the same term it retained the traditional two-tier ap-
proach.148 
Viewed less charitably, the cases can be taken to show that no 
new test exists at all. Jackson,149 Humphrey,150 and ]ames151 only ex-
tended past rational-basis precedents. Mosley152 and Baird153 can be 
read as involving fundamental interests, which justify strict judicial 
146. See note 57 supra. 
147. Neither the Boraas court nor Professor Gunther really come to grips with this 
problem. The Boraas majority briefly suggests, "This approach is particularly appro-
priate in cases of the present type, where individual human rights of groups as opposed 
to business regulations are involved," 476 F.2d at 815, but neglects to say why the stan-
dard was not employed in cases such as Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (wel-
fare), or Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972) (housing), where individual rights to wel-
fare and housing benefits were at stake. 
Professor Gunther suggests that the use of his model would be limited only by con-
siderations of "judicial competence," rather than on the basis of "a priori categoriza-
tions of the 'social :i,nd economic' variety." Gunther, supra note 25, at 23. He assumes 
that there is judicial competence to determine "the rationality of means used in solving 
many 'economic and social' problems," id. at 24 (emphasis added), but not to solve prob-
lems that are "exceedingly technical and complex" or problems in response to which the 
legislature can legitimately adopt several approaches. Id. Gunther, however, does not 
consider the difficulty of dealing with an ad hoc standard, the application of ·which 
would be rendered even more uncertain by the level of "competence" of whoever hap-
pened to be on the court at the time. In addition it does not appear that the courts are 
limiting the new standard in such a way. The Second Circuit, in Aguayo v. Richardson, 
473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (1973), cert. denied, 42 U.S.L.W. 3406 (U.S., Jan. 14, 1974), cited the 
new approach in an opinion remanding a particularly complex case. 
148. Minimal scrutiny was employed in Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); 
Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1972); Schill v. Knebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971); and Richard-
son v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78 (1971). See also Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 
410 U.S. 356 (1973); McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263 (1973); and United States v. Kras, 
409 U.S. 434 (1973). 
149. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra. 
150. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra. 
151. See text accompanying notes 94-106 supra. 
152. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra, 
153. See text accompanying notes 123-44 supra. 
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review. Reed154 and Weber155 can be interpreted as involving suspect 
classifications, and Reed can also be read as an orthodox striking-
down of an arbitrary classification. 
This group of Supreme Court cases, however, can also be seen as 
pointing toward a middle-ground test of equal protection, a test re-
quiring more than a conceivable rational relationship. As noted pre-
viously,156 equal protection analysis always involves a dual inquiry: 
Not only must the means be rationally related to the ends, but the 
intrinsic nature of the class must bear some relationship to the statu-
tory objective, so that similarly situated groups are not treated differ-
ently. It is suggested that it is in this second area that the Court is ap-
plying heightened judicial scrutiny. 
In Jackson the Court's inquiry centered on whether the especially 
severe commitment procedures for mentally defective criminal defen-
dants could be distinguished from commitment procedures for all 
other individuals. Looking to the record, the Court concluded that 
grounds for the distinction did not exist. 
The analysis in Humphrey focused on possible grounds for differ-
ent commitment procedures for sex offenders. Rather than hypothe-
size a basis for the differing treatment, the Court remanded the case 
for an evidentiary hearing to determine, among other things, if there 
was any special characteristic of sex offenders that would make a jury 
trial inappropriate. Of course, the requirement of a concrete demon-
stration fits Professor Gunther's proposed test, but Gunther suggested 
a showing of a factual tie between means and ends. Humphrey may 
require some sort of showing for the more limited purpose of deter-
mining if adequate grounds for distinction benveen ostensibly simi-
larly situated groups exist. 
Reed, James, and Baird exhibit the same analysis in even more 
striking fashion. In Reed, not only did the sex classification have to 
facilitate probate procedure, but the intrinsic characteristic of the 
class, sex, had to be shown to bear some relationship to expedited ad-
ministration. The Court summarily concluded it did not. Possible 
arguments of conceivable rationality that might have been presented 
to explain the differing classification-for example, that men might 
have more business experience-were not even discussed. Similarly, 
in James the Court appeared to presume that indigent criminal de-
fendants could not be distinguished from civil debtors for the pur-
pose of denying certain exemptions from creditor process. The Court 
did not consider the possible argument that indigent criminal defen-
dants would be more likely to conceal assets than civil debtors. And 
in Baird, although most of the opinion dealt with the consideration 
154. See text accompanying notes 107-22 supra. 
155. See text accompanying notes 83-93 supra. 
156. See text accompanying note 114 supta. 
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and rejection of purported legislative goals, in the closing portion of 
the opinion the Court stated without discussion that married and un-
married persons were indistinguishable for the purpose of contracep-
tive distribution. Again, the similarity of situation was presumed. 
Humphrey, James, Reed, and to a lesser extent, Baird, Weber, · 
Mosley,161 and]ackson, all suggest a heightened level of judicial re-
view, with the focus on grounds of distinction between classes.158 The 
level of scrutiny is uncertain, as most of the cases presumed the classes 
to be indistinguishable, but the cases may be read as requiring at least 
something more than conceivably rational grounds of distinction 
where the posited grounds are not applicable in every case.159 
The basis for the intensified review is not completely clear. Three 
of the cases, Reed, Weber, and Baird, involved what might be termed 
emerging fundamental rights or emerging suspect classifications. 
Jackson and Humphrey could arguably fit this pattern, as both cases 
concerned discriminatory commitment procedures of mentally dis-
turbed or retarded individuals, a class that could trouble the Court 
because it possesses many of the indicia of a suspect class.160 Mosley 
and James involved fringe areas of already recognized rights-specifi-
cally, first amendment rights and the right of an indigent criminal to 
assistance of counsel. In this regard Boraas seems a suitable case for 
the application of a more stringent review, as it raises issues on the 
fringe area of the recognized right of association.161 
Applied to Boraas, this analysis would have the court focus on the 
reasons for the different treatment accorded to ·related and nonrelated 
157. Mosley did focus on the grounds for distinction between labor and all other 
forms of picketing. However, the degree of review is easily explained by the presence 
of first amendment rights in the case. See text accompanying note 73 supra. 
158. It is not suggested that scrutiny of the grounds of distinction between groups 
is an altogether new phenomenon. As Chief Justice Burger's quotation in Reed from 
F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1919), makes clear, such concern 
has existed for many years: "[A classification] must rest upon some ground of difference 
having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons 
similarly situated shall be treated alike." 404 U.S. at 76. See also Railway Express Agency, 
Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) Gack.son, J., concurring): "The framers of the 
Constitution knew ••• that there is no more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary 
and unreasonable government than to require that the principles of law which officials 
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally. Conversely, nothing opens 
the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow those officials to pick and choose 
only a few to whom they will apply legislation •••• " Noteworthy in the recent cases 
is the virtual assumption, demonstrated by the summary refusal to consider justifying 
arguments, that there are no grounds for distinction. This analytic technique is, by 
and large, unique to the recent Supreme Court cases. 
159. For instance, Reed could be interpreted as saying that, because not every woman 
has less business experience than every man, this ground of distinction is not rational 
enough to satisfy the equal protection clause. 
160. See Comment, Segregation of Poor and Minority Children into Classes for the 
Mentally Retarded by the Use of IQ Tests, 71 MICH. L. REv. 1212, 1236 (1973). 
161. See authorities cited in note 20 supra. 
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groups, rather than on the means-end connection.102 The inquiry 
would center, not on possible traffic, noise, and congestion problems 
caused by nonrelated groups, but on whether nonrelated groups cause 
these assorted problems to a greater extent than do traditional fam-
ilies. Although the Boraas court was avowedly searching only for a 
means-end connection, it does appear that, when applying its test, 
it was actually focusing on the reasons for the distinction between 
the classesJ63 At one point the court appears to ask for a factual show-
ing justifying the differing treatment.164 The court also approached 
the problem on a more generalized plane when, quoting Trottner, it 
theorized that not every nonrelated group differs from traditional 
families in the amount of noise, traffic, and congestion caused.10n The 
fact that the classes were found to be identical in the relevant aspects, 
apparently because the distinction was not valid for every, or at least 
most, nonfamily groups, appears to indicate that the court, like the 
cases it cites, was looking for more than a rational grounds of distinc-
tion. Although the lack of a distinction was not presumed in Boraas 
as it was in Reed, James, or Baird, the court's analysis seems compar-
able to that of the Supreme Court in those cases. Nevertheless, even 
accepting the interpretation of Boraas most consistent with the Su-
preme Court precedents, there is no explanation for why the Boraas 
court felt constrained to drag the less onerous means analysis into its 
opinion. It is thus unclear whether the lack of a demonstration of a 
basis of distinction between the classes was a ground of decision, and 
it is also uncertain what significance the court attached to the tech-
nique for which the precedents seem to stand. 
In summary, while an expansive reading of the recent Supreme 
Court cases indicates that some sort of middle-ground review may be 
undertaken on occasion, the degree of additional scrutiny that may be 
undertaken and the situations in which middle-ground review is ap-
plicable are unclear. Boraas exhibits some characteristics of this pos-
tulated middle-ground approach but also strikes out into completely 
new territory. 
III. THE Rodriguez OPINION 
Boraas was decided on February 27, 1973. On March 21, 1973, the 
Supreme Court handed down its decision in San Antonio lndepen-
162. If, as in Humphrey, see text accompanying note 70 supra, the court wished to 
make a factual determination of the issues, different results could occur in different 
communities, for certain municipalities might be able to show additional burdens on 
facilities due to occupancy of nonrelated persons, while others might not. 
163. The court may have engaged in some means-end scrutiny in the section of the 
opinion following the citation of Kirsch Holding Co. v. Manasquan, 59 N.J. 241, 281 
A.2d 513 (1971). See 476 F.2d at 817. That case found a similar zoning ordinance invalid 
under a due process theory that stressed the lack of a means-end connection. See note 47 
supra and text accompanying notes 237-41 infra, 
164. See text accompanying note 40 supra. 
165. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra, 
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dent School District v. Rodriguez.166 The Rodriguez majority em-
phatically opted for the traditional two-tier equal protection ap-
proach, ignored the possibility of a new emergent standard, and read 
some of the cases relied on by the Boraas court in such a way as to 
negate any precedential value they might have had as harbingers of a 
new equal protection. 
Rodriguez involved a class action filed on behalf of certain Texas 
school children challenging the constitutionality of the state's statu-
tory system of financing public education under the equal protection 
clause. The system authorized an ad valorem tax by each school dis-
trict on property within the district to supplement educational funds 
received from the state. This resulted in substantial interdistrict dis-. 
parities in per-pupil expenditures; the disparities were chiefly attrib-
utable to the fact that differing amounts were received through local 
property taxation because of variations in the amount of taxable 
property within each district. A three-judge district court had held 
that the system discriminated on the basis of wealth and was thus un-
constitutional; it found that wealth was a suspect classification and 
that education was a fundamental interest. In the alternative, the 
court ruled that the state had failed to meet even the minimal scru-
tiny test.167 The Supreme Court, in a five-four decision, reversed. 
At the outset of the opinion, the Court described its framework 
for analysis: 
We must decide, first, whether the Texa;; system of financing public 
education operates to the disadvantage of some suspect class or im-
pinges upon a fundamental right explicitly or implicitly protected 
by the Constitution, thereby requiring strict judicial scrutiny • . . . 
If not, the Texas scheme must still be examined to determine whether 
it rationally furthers some legitimate, articulated state purpose and 
therefore does not constitute an invidious discrimination in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,168 
The Court thus clearly opts for nvo-tier equal protection. The mid-
dle ground proposed in Boraas played no part in the Court's analytic 
framework,169 and the remainder of the opinion confirms the express 
adoption of a nvo-level analysis. 
166. 411 U.S. 1 (1973). 
167, Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (1971). 
168, 411 U.S. at 17. 
169. The Court did require a rational relation to a "legitimate, articulated state 
purpose," a slight change over the traditional minimal scrutiny test, which deferred to 
legislative enactments to the extent of hypothesizing justifying purposes. The change 
to a requirement of an articulated rationale conforms to Professor Gunther's model 
and also to the Boraas dissent's reading of recent Supreme Court opinions. However, 
this slight change of judicial attitude would not affect the analysis of the Boraas ma-
jority, which had articulated state objectives on the record before it, The Supreme 
Court cited no authority for the requirement of an articulated purpose, At later points 
in the opinion, the Court stated the test in absolutely orthodox form. E.g., 411 U.S. 
at 55. The Court's decision in Boraas also made no mention of a new standard. 42 
U.S.L.W. at 4477. 
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The Court first determined that no suspect classification was in-
volved in the case. While not ruling directly on the issue of whether 
classifications based on a lack of wealth are inherently invidious, the 
Court noted that this was not a case where a classification involving 
wealth entailed absolute denial of a benefit, pointed out that no clear-
cut class of the poor was being discriminated against, and rejected the 
broad notion that a classific_ation that creates a class composed solely 
of persons living in a district with less taxable wealth could be 
deemed to be inherently suspect.17° 
The Court then found that education was not a fundamental 
right. To arrive at this conclusion, the Court posited a standard for 
determining if a right is fundamental: "[T]he key to discovering 
whether education is 'fundamental' is not to be found in comparisons 
of the relative societal significance of education as opposed to subsis-
tence or housing. Nor is it to be found by weighing whether educa-
tion is as important as the right to travel. Rather, the answer lies in 
assessing whether there is a right to education explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution."171 Cited as authority for this propo-
sition, inter alia, were Mosley and Baird.112 In a footnote, the Court 
described Mosley as "[striking] down a Chicago antipicketing ordi-
nance that exempted labor picketing from its prohibitions. The ordi-
nance was held invalid under the Equal Protection Clause after sub-
jecting it to careful scrutiny and finding that the ordinance was not 
narrowly drawn. The stricter standard of review was appropriately ap-
plied since the ordinance was one 'affecting First Amendment inter-
ests.' "173 Justice Marshall, in dissent, also interpreted Mosley as a case 
calling for strict judicial scrutiny due to the presence of questions in-
volving the guaranteed right of freedom of speech.174 Mosley thus can 
no longer be cited as authority for the standard articulated in Boraas. 
The Rodriguez Court also hinted that Baird could be viewed as a 
strict scrutiny case. The majority said in a footnote that 
[i]n Eisenstadt [v. Baird] the . Court struck down a Massachusetts 
statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptive devices, find-
ing that the law failed "to satisfy even the more lenient equal pro-
tection standard." ... Nevertheless, in dictum, the Court recited the 
correct form of equal protection analysis: "[I]f we were to conclude 
that the Massachusetts statute impinges upon fundamental freedoms 
under Griswold ... , the statutory classification would have to be 
not merely rationally related to a valid public purpose but necessary 
to the achievement of a compelling state interest."176 
170. 411 U.S. at 25, 28. 
171. 411 U.S. at 33-34. 
172. 411 U.S. at 34. 
173. 411 U.S. at 34 n.75, quoting 408 U.S. at IOI. 
174. 411 U.S. at 99. 
175. 411 U.S. at 34 n.73, quoting 405 U.S. at 447 n.7 (emphasis original), 
lJ 
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It is possible to interpret this cryptic footnote as implying that Baird 
is a strict scrutiny case because a right implicitly recognized in the 
Constitution, the right of marital privacy, was impinged upon. Jus-
tice Marshall, in dissent, interpreted the case in this way.176 In any 
case, the fact that the Court described the Baird holding as "finding 
that the law failed 'to satisfy even the more lenient equal protection 
standard' " and did not mention the intense level of review and lack 
of tolerance to stated legislative purposes that characterized that opin-
ion's analytic technique fits the case into the traditional two-level ap-
proach. Again, any precedential value as support for the Boraas opin-
ion is significantly weakened. 
The Court, after finding that education was not explicitly or im-
plicitly guaranteed by the Constitution,177 went on to analyze the 
Texas legislative scheme under the traditional standard of review. 
Again, there was not even a hint of an intermediate standard. And, in 
applying the rational relationship standard, the Court not only did 
not carefully scrutinize the relationship of the means to the state pur-
pose, but showed a great degree of tolerance and noted that "[t]he 
very complexity of the problems of financing and managing a state-
wide public school system suggests that 'there will be more than one 
constitutionally permissible method of solving them.' ... "178 Ulti-
mately, the Court found the state's financing system to be rationally 
related to the legitimate purpose of encouraging local participation 
in and control of each district's schools.179 
The relationship of means to ends was attacked by appellees in a 
manner suggestive of the Boraas approach: "Appellees do not ques-
tion the propriety of Texas' dedication to local control of education. 
To the contrary, they attack the school-financing system precisely be-
cause •.. it does not provide the same level of local control and fiss;al 
flexibility in all districts. Appellees suggest that local control could be 
preserved and promoted under other financing systems that resulted 
in more equality in educational expenditures."180 In other words, 
they argued that no rational relationship existed because there were 
other financing systems that could raise revenue and encourage local 
176. 411 U.S. at 103-04. See also 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477. 
177. The Court was faced with, and rejected, the argument that education should 
be considered a fundamental riggt because it was necessary if a person's right to free 
speech and right to vote were to be exercised in a meaningful manner. The Court 
thought that the argument would be equally applicable in the areas of welfare and 
housing and thus would be at odds with past decisions. 411 U.S. at 37. It also noted that 
"we have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to 
the citizenry the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice." 411 U.S. 
at 36 (emphasis original). Justice Brennan, in dissent, accepted the argument that there 
was a ne.xus between education and first amendment rights and therefore would have 
classified education as a fundamental right. 411 U.S. at 63. 
178. 411 U.S. at 42, quoting Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 546-47 (1972). 
179. 411 U.S. at 55. 
180. 411 U.S. at 50. 
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control without creating the same disparity in per-pupil expendi-
tures. This argument is very similar to the two arguments accepted by 
the Boraas court: that nonrelated groups do not always have an ad-
verse effect on, for example, rent values and land use intensity; and 
that the same goals could be achieved by less restrictive means. 
The Rodriguez Court's response to this less oner~us means argu-
ment casts the Boraas analysis into grave doubt: "While it is no doubt 
true that reliance on local property taxation for school revenues pro-
vides ,less freedom of choice with respect to expenditures for some 
districts than for others, the existence of 'some inequality' in the man-
ner in which the State's rationale is achieved is not alone a sufficient 
basis for striking down the entire system."181 Applying the same anal-
ysis to Boraas, the fact that not every nonconsanguineous group has a 
deleterious effect on legitimate zoning objectives would not render 
the system unconstitutional, for it would indicate only the "existence 
of 'some inequality' in the manner in which the State'slrationale is 
achieved."182 The Rodriguez Court continued: "Nor must the financ-
ing system fail because, as appellees suggest, other methods of satisfy-
ing the State's interest, which occasion 'less drastic' disparities in ex-
penditures, might be conceived. Only where state action impinges on 
the exercise of fundamental constitutional rights or liberties must it 
be found to have chosen the least restrictive altemative."183 Although 
the Boraas court explicitly rejected application of strict scrutiny at 
the outset of the opinion, it adopted a test that, as Rodriguez makes 
clear, is only applicable in fundamental rights cases. 
On the other hand, the Rodriguez opinion does contain more dis-
cussion of rationality than do earlier minimal scrutiny opinions. The 
entire Texas funding scheme is set out in detail at the outset of the 
opjnion,184 and there is some discussion of the actual operation of the 
system.185 In reaching its conclusion, 'however, the Court accepted 
quite docilely the state's argument that the scheme furthered the goal 
of encouraging local participation and control while ensuring a basic 
education. The Court, after simply quoting the statutes involved, 
agreed that the system rationally supported the state goal: 
181. 411 U.S. at 50-51, citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Dandrldge 
v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). A month later, in Mourning v, Family Publications 
Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356 (1973), the Court sustained the imposition on all members 
of a defined class of an allegedly "imprecise" rule promulgated pursuant to the Truth in 
Lending Act because it served to discourage evasion by a substantial portion of that 
class of disclosure mechanisms required by Congress for consumer protection. This case 
bears on any overinclusion argument that could be made when attacking a Boraas-type 
of zoning ordinance. See text accompanying notes 236-43 infra, 
182. Rodriguez, however, did involve an extremely complex problem, so the Court 
may have been more tolerant of inexact classifications than it would be upon revlcw 
of the relatively simple ordinance involved in Boraas. 
183. 411 U.S. at 51. 
184. 411 U.S. at 6-14. 
185. 411 U.S. at 13-14, 15 nn. 38 &: 46. 
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While it is no doubt true that reliance on local property taxation for 
school revenues provides less freedom of choice with respect to ex-
penditures for some districts than for others, ... [i]t is ... well to 
remember that even those districts that have reduced ability to make 
free decisions ·with respect to how much they spend on education 
still retain under the present system a large measure of authority as 
to how available funds will be allocated.186 
After noting that the existence of some inequality can never be the 
basis for striking down an entire system, the Court, in traditional 
fashion, presumed the system valid: "[I]t is rooted in decades of ex-
perience in Texas and elsewhere, and in major part is the product of 
responsible studies by qualified people. In giving substance to the 
presumption of validity to which the Texas system is entitled ... it is 
important to remember that at every stage of its development it has 
constituted a 'rough accommodation' of interests in an effort to arrive 
at practical and workable solutions."187 · 
Thus, the Court, by and large, deferred to the state's position, a 
far cry from requiring the factual showing that the Boraas court found 
necessary. The detailed description in Rodriguez of the Texas plan 
could have been included in response to the four dissenters,188 who all 
questioned the system's rationality. The majority was also faced with 
an adverse decision below, a state court decision invalidating a simi-
lar financing plan,189 and an unusual amount of public and scholarly 
controversy and interest.190 It is more likely that these factors induced 
the Court's long description of the Texas scheme than that the Court 
was, without comment, requiring some sort of showing of a height-
ened rationality before validating the financing plan. 
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, reiterated the majority's 
approach: "I join the opinion and judgment of the Court because I 
am convinced that any other course would mark an extraordinary de-
parture from principled adjudicatfon under the Equal Protection 
Clause .... "191 Noting that the clause is o~ended only by laws that 
make "wholly arbitrary or capricious" classifications,192 he went on to 
state that this doctrine exemplifies "one of the first principles of con-
186. 411 U.S. at 50-51. 
187. 411 ·U.S. at 55. 
188. See 411 U.S. at 50 n.107, 51-52 n.108. 
189, Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P .2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971). 
190. See, e.g., J. CooNs, W. CLUNE&: S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIC EnuCA-
TION (1970); Goldstein, Interdistrict Inequalities in School Financing: A Critical Analysis 
of Serrano v. Priest and its Progeny, 120 U. PA. L. REY. 504 (1972); Comment, Educa-
tional Financing, Equal Protection of the Laws, and the Supreme Court, 70 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 1324 (1972); Moynihan, Can Courts and Money Do It?, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1972, 
§ E, at 1, col. 3 {late city ed.). 
_191. 411 U.S. at 59. 
192. 411 U.S. at 60, citing Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966), which was the chief 
precedent for James. See 407 U.S. at 140-41; text accompanying notes 97-101 supra. 
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stitutional adjudication-the basic presumption of the constitutional 
validity of a duly enacted state or federal law.''193 This presumption 
only disappears when a classification is based on suspect criteria104 or 
"impinges on a substantive right or liberty created or conferred by 
the Constitution.''195 He concluded by agreeing with the Court that 
the classifications before the Court did not rest "on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective."196 
Justice Stewart's emphasis on a presumption of legislative validity 
differs strongly from Professor Gunther's model, which emphasizes a 
less deferential attitude to legislative enactments in order to verify 
the reality of means-end connection. Justice Stewart's re-emphasis of 
the majority's "wholly irrelevant" language also clashes markedly 
·with both Gunther's model and the Boraas majority's averred re-
quirement of "substantial means-ends relationship."197 
After Rodriguez, virtually nothing remains of a doctrinal base 
for the Boraas opinion. While an intermediate standard is not ex-
plicitly rejected,198 the Court restates orthodox two-tier equal protec-
tion formulations and makes no mention of any third test. The 
Court's application of the rational relationship test is noteworthy in 
its tolerance of classifications admittedly creating "some inequal-
193. 411 U.S. at 60. 
194. 411 U.S. at 61, citing, inter alia, Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., discussed in 
text accompanying notes 83-93 supra. 
195. 411 U.S. at 61, citing, inter alia, Police Dept. v. Mosley, discussed in text ac• 
companying notes 72-82 supra. 
196. 411 U.S. at 62. 
197. Justice Marshall wrote a long and compelling dissent, joined by Justice Douglas, 
Justice Marshall excoriated the "rigidified approach to equal protection analysis" 
adopted by the majority, 411 U.S. at 99, and advocated instead a sliding-scale approach: 
"We must consider the substantiality of the state interests sought to be served, and we · 
must scrutinize the reasonableness of the means by which the State has sought to 
advance its interests." 411 U.S. at 124. "'[C]oncentration [is] placed upon the character 
of the classification in question, the relative importance to individuals in the class 
discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the 
asserted state interests in support of the classification.'" 411 U.S. at 99, quoting 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970). See also Richardson v. Belcher, 404 
U.S. 78, 90 (1971) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519·21 
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). In his Rodriguez. dissent, Justice Marshall read Baird, 
Reed, James, and Weber as supporting the sliding-scale approach. See 411 U.S. at 103-10, 
Justice White now appears to support the position advocated by Justice Marshall. 
See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 458-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring). 
The obvious drawback to a flexible, ad hoc balancing approach based on a judicial 
determination of the relative importance of the various rights and interests involved 
is the resemblance that this bears to the discredited, see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
726 (1963), fundamental rights due process test. See Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 
459-63 (1973) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Weber v. Aetna Cas. &: Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 
179-80 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484-85 
(1970) (Stewart, J.); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 76-82 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
198. Justice Stewart did refer to the sliding-scale approach advocated by Justice 
Marshall as taking "uncharted directions" and as a "departure from principled ad• 
judication under the Equal Protection Clause," 411 U.S. at 59. 1 
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ity."199 0£ the Boraas precedents, Baird,200 Weber,201 and Mosley202 
were read in Rodriguez as cases requiring strict scrutiny. ]ames203 had 
been cited by the Court in a previous opinion as lead authority for 
the application of the minimal scrutiny test,204 and Reed205 has been 
interpreted as involving a suspect class.206 
199. Justice Stewart characterized the Texas financing plan as "chaotic and unjust." 
4ll U.S. at 59. 
200. See text accompanying notes 123-44 supra. 
201. See text accompanying notes 83-93 supra. 
202. See text accompanying notes 72-82 supra. 
203. See text accompanying notes 94-106 supra. 
204. See McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 270 (1973). 
205. See text accompanying notes 107-22 supra. 
206. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 4ll U.S. 677, 682 (1973). Reed might also be viewed 
as an e.xample of an unconstitutionally irrebuttable presumption. In Vlandis v. Kline, 
412 U.S. 441 (1973), the Court struck down, as violative of the due process clause, 
portions of a Connecticut statute that categorized students at state colleges as residents 
and nonresidents of the state for the purpose of assessing tuition. The statutory defini. 
tions created a "permanent and irrebuttable presumption" of nonresidency for a 
student's entire sojourn at the university if the student's legal address at the time of 
admission was outside of Connecticut. No change in status was permitted, even if the 
student had actually become a state resident. The Court held that, "since Connecticut 
purports to be concerned with residency in allocating the rates for tuition and fees at 
its university system, it is forbidden by the Due Process Clause to deny an individual 
the resident rates on the basis of a permanent and irrebuttable presumption of non• 
residence, when that presumption is not necessarily or universally true in fact, and when 
the State has reasonable alternative means of making the crucial determination." 412 
U.S. at 452. The Court later emphasized that the essential due process violation lay in 
providing no opportunity to challenge the presumption. 412 U.S. at 453. The Court's 
discussion closely tracked equal protection analysis, as various state justifying rationales 
were considered and rejected, the means-end connection being considered either un-
related, or purely arbitrary. See 412 U.S. at 448-52. 
The "irrebuttable presumption" approach was again employed in the Court's recent 
decision in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 42 U.S.L.W. 4186 (U.S., Jan. 21, 1974), 
which found mandatory statutory maternity leave regulations violative of the due process 
clause as unduly impinging upon the fundamental right to bear children. 42 U.S.L.W. 
at 4191. Limitations upon a teacher's eligibility to return to work after giving birth were 
similarly struck down. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4192. One of the objectives put forward by the 
state was the necessity of keeping physically unfit teachers out of the classroom. While 
admitting that some teachers might become physically disabled after the fifth-month 
cut-off date (the date of enforced leave), the Court stated that the rules sw·ept "too 
broadly" and that, in the absence of an "individualized determination by the teacher's 
doctor-or the school board's-as to any particular teacher's ability to continue at her 
job," the provisions "'contain an irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency." 
42 U.S.L.W. at 4190. The Court noted that the record indicated that "each preguancy 
was an individual matter, and should be prescribed for as such." 42 U.S.L.W. at 4190 
n.12. The Court then suggested less onerous means of effectuating the same goal, 42 
U.S.L.W. at 4191 n.14, and concluded that the rules "cannot pass muster under the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they employ irrebuttable 
presumptions." 42 U.S.L.W. at 4191. 
This analysis is very similar to that employed in Boraas, in spite of the difference in 
the ultimate ground of decision. It should be noted that LaFleur also quoted ap• 
provingly from Green v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (1973), a Second Circuit 
opinion involving similar facts decided under the equal protection test applied in 
Boraas. Boraas, however, does not involve a legislatively explicit presumption, as did 
all the cases in which the Court has applied the irrebuttable presumption approach. 
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There is a certain rigidity in the Court's reading of its prior cases. 
Its assumption that equal protection cases fall neatly into two cate, 
gories ignores substantive difficulties in previous cases. Reed, Baird, 
and, to a lesser extent, James, Humphrey,201 and Weber, were all 
avowedly rational basis cases but contained analytic techniques for-
eign to the minimal scrutiny standard. To refer to these cases as 
adopting strict judicial scrutiny, as the Frontiero plurality did with 
regard to Reed,208 and the Court has done with Weber,200 is a real 
failure to come to grips with the possibility of an intermediate stan-
dard of equal protection review. Nevertheless, Rodriguez and Fron-
tiero indicate a clear disposition on the part of the Court to adopt an 
exclusively two-tiered approachzlo and to interpret past cases accord-
ingly. The Court's opinion in Boraas confirms this tendency. 
It could be argued that Rodriguez shares many common features 
·with the seven Boraas precedents. It involves the fringe areas of strict 
scrutiny (a possible fundamental right, education; and a sometimes 
suspect group, the poor)211 and was, therefore, an appropriate case in 
which to employ some type of heightened scrutiny.212 The Boraas 
To say that the Belle Terre ordinance contains an unconstitutional conclusive presump• 
tion that all nonconsanguineous groups cause more traffic, noise, and other assorted 
problems than traditional families, when the presumption does not appear in the 
ordinance, is to appreciably extend the irrebuttable presumption technique. 
LaFleur is further distinguishable. While the Court does use the "irrebuttable pre• 
sumption" language, the case is similar to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), Both are 
decided under the due process clause; both involve women and the right to have 
children; and both explicitly recognize the right as tied to the fundamental right of 
personal privacy. It seems that LaFleur fits into the large class of cases that deal with 
important personal rights and that, as a result, use a strict scrutiny approach. In effect, 
when applying the label "irrebuttable presumption," the Court is drawing conclusions 
after closely scrutinizing the means-end relationship, looking for less onerous means, and 
finding that no compelling interest was involved. 
An unrestrained use by the Court of the "irrebuttable presumption" approach could 
lead to its completely supplanting equal protection analysis, Virtually every legislative 
classification presumes that certain individuals fall within or without a classification, so 
that any individual who falls within a classification, but who does not in fact further 
the classification's objective, could challenge the legislation on the ground that it 
created an irrebuttable presumption. Such an argument is not usually possible on equal 
protection grounds, because it is a basic tenet of equal protection adjudication that 
"classifications need not be made with mathematical precision." Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), citing Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co,, 220 U.S. 61, 78 
(1911). 
207. See text accompanying notes 69-71 supra. 
208. See text accompanying note 120 supra. 
209. See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra. 
210. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Rodrigue: is the most succinct explica• 
tion of this approach. See 411 U.S. at 59-62. 
211. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (education). The majority in 
Rodriguez suggested that complete deprivation of a generally held right because of 
impecuniousness could call for strict judicial scrutiny. 411 U.S. at 20·22, 
212. There is precedent for applying the compelling interest t~t in situations where 
both a near fundamental right and a near suspect class are involved in the same case, 
0 
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precedents seemed to be focusing review on the grounds of distinction 
between similarly situated groups. If this approach had been applied 
in Rodriguez, the Court would have isolated the disparities in per-
pupil expenditures based on property tax revenues and then required 
some showing by the state to justify the differential treatment between 
districts. The Court did note the unequal expenditures in the Edge-
wood district, compared with more affluent districts,213 and looked 
only to the record to explain the differential treatment; it refused to 
hypothesize a justification. It also could be argued that the Court 
carefully examined the workings of the state system and only foµnd 
a rational basis for the distinction to exist when the strong state in-
terest in local control of education was shown to be furthered by this 
mode of financing. 
However, this analysis would overlook the deference paid to the 
state's arguments and the Court's insistence on applying the tradi-
tional formula to the case. The Boraas precedents, in their summary 
refusal to consider conceivable grounds of distinction between 
groups, appeared to place a burden on the state to justify differential 
treatment. Any burden in Rodriguez was clearly on the appellees. 
The Court indulged a presumption of legislative validity, agreed 
·without concrete demonstration with the state's argument that local 
control was furthered by the financing plan, 214 and never accepted 
the appellees' basic premise that reduced expenditures led to a cor-
responding reduction in quality of education.215 The inescapable 
conclusion is that the equal protection test announced in Boraas 
simply does not exist, or no longer exists, and that future adjudication 
·will be within the parameters of the two-tier approc1:ch. 
Soon after the Boraas opinion appeared, a poll of all the Second 
Circuit judges was taken as to whether the case should be reheard~ en 
banc.216 The petition was denied by a four-four vote. Immediately 
after this poll Rodriguez was handed dmvn. Judges Timbers and 
Mansfield, writing after Rodriguez, took the opportunity to comment. 
Judge Timbers ·wrote that 
the Supreme Court's very recent decision in [Rodriguez] strongly 
indicates that the traditional minimal scrutiny equal protection 
Thus, in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), and in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12 (1956), the presence of the interest in criminal appeal and the classification based on 
ability to pay may have induced the court to scrutinize strictly the classification involved. 
213. 411 U.S. at 18-14, 46, 
214. See 411 U.S. at 50-54. 
215. "On even the most basic questions in this area the scholars and educational 
experts are divided, Indeed, one of the major sources of controversy concerns the 
extent to which there is a demonstrable correlation between educational expenditures 
and the quality of education-an assumed correlation underlying virtually every legal 
conclusion drawn by the District Court in this case," 411 U.S. at 42-43. ' 
216. 476 F.2d at 824. . 
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standard should have been applied in the instant case. In Rodriguez, 
the Court held that "the traditional standard of review, which re-
quires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate state purposes," should be applied .... In 
short, the Court refused to "intrude in an area in which it has tradi-
tionally deferred to state legislatures." State or local decisions 
regarding limitations on the use of land traditionally have been 
accorded this same great deference by federal courts for the same 
reasons a state's handling of public expenditures are not to be dis-
turbed .... In the light of Rodriguez, it seems to me that a fortiori 
the decision in the instant case, which surely constitutes a substantial 
interference ·with a municipality's zoning policies, was erroneous.217 
Judge Mansfield replied, 
[In Rodriguez,] the Court, following a well beaten path used in 
review of certain types of economic discrimination, applied "the 
traditional standard of review" to state legislation of an essentially 
economic nature, ·which was challenged because of its social conse-
quences.[2181 Here we are not concerned with commercial legislation 
but with a local ordinance directed squarely against the personal 
right£219l of individuals to associate and live together ... .12201 
If anything, our decision here is in accord with the Supreme Court's 
decision in Rodriguez. In describing the standard applied by it, the 
Court there stated that ... "the traditional standard of review .•. 
requires only that the State's system be shown to bear some rational 
relationship to legitimate State purposes" .... These statements 
not only are consistent with our review but would require us to nul-
lify the Belle Terre ordinance for failure to further any legitimate 
zoning objective.221 
217. 476 F.2d at 826-27. Rodriguez is, however, an example of a particularly complex 
problem, in which "considerations of judicial competence" could partly explain the 
noninterventionist stance of the Court. See note 147 supra. 
218. Even granting arguendo that the legislative scheme was essentially economic 
in nature, nothing in Rodriguez indicates any intention to limit traditional review to 
such cases. 
219. Justice Stewart has raised doubts as to the constructiveness of pursuing the 
property right-personal right distinction that Judge Mansfield suggests: o 
[T)he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one. Prop• 
erty does not have rights. People have rights. The right to enjoy property without 
unlawful deprivation no less than the right to speak or the right to travel, is in 
truth a "personal" right, whether the "property" in question be a welfare check, a 
home, or a saving account. In fact, a fundamental interdependence e.xists between 
the personal right to liberty and the personal right in property. Neither could have 
meaning without the other. That rigbts in property are basic civil rights has long 
been recognized. 
Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552 (1972). See also Goldberg v. Kelly, 
397 U.S. 254 (1970); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
220. The Boraas majority specifically stated that it was not ruling on claims of 
privacy. 476 F.2d at 814. Judge Mansfield's statement suggests that the majority actually 
balanced the rights affected and the legislative purpose, despite its disavowal of such 
an approach. 
· . 221. 476 F.2d at 828-29. The Supreme Court found that the ordinance furthered a 
series of legitimate objectives. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477. See note 34 supra. 
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Judge Mansfield's argument, however, seems ingenuous. The 
Rodriguez Court's presumption of legislative validity was manifested 
by a clearly deferential stance towards legislative enactments; and, 
in determining whether the requisite rational relationship existed, the 
Court stated that imperfect classifications are acceptable. Boraa.s, 
while stating that the ordinance did not appear to be supported by 
any rational basis, reached the conclusion by applying a different 
equal protection test, by rejecting other possible zoning objectives, 
and, apparently, by requiring that no less onerous means be available. 
In spite of a bare holding utilizing words similar to the Rodriguez 
standard, the rationales of the two cases are not consistent. 
IV. Boraas UNDER TRADITIONAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Two arguments remain under which the Second Circuit might 
be said to have found the ordinance to be unconstitutional under 
traditional standards: The classification might be found to be either 
underinclusive or overinclusive to the point of arbitrariness. 
Boraas could be read as accepting the view that the classification 
at issue was unconstitutionally underinclusive in that it excluded 
some persons who would also contribute to the problems to which 
the ordinance was directed. The court appeared to reject the argu-
ment that members of unrelated groups would be more likely to 
cause traffic, parking, and congestion problems than members of a 
traditional family. Quoting from Trottner,222 it noted that a case 
dealing with a Boraas-type of ordinance, Palo Alto Tenants Union v. 
Morgan,223 considered the same arguments and found a rational re-
lationship between the classification and the zoning goals. That court 
held that no irrationality was involved: 
[G]iven the fact that the average size of even the traditional family 
is less than four members, the [c]ourt sees no arbitrariness in limiting 
the number of unrelated persons living in an R-1 dwelling, while 
not so limiting the size of the traditional family in such dwellings .... 
. • . Noise, traffic problems, and overloaded parking facilities may 
tend to result when one-family homes become communal dwellings . 
. . . Often owners find it more profitable to rent these dwellings, 
not to single families, but to large groups of unrelated persons with 
independent sources of income. Such groups are able to pay, collec-
tively, far more in rent than can traditional families with one, or at 
best two, wage earners. Thus the rent structure of a whole neighbor-
222. See text accompanying notes 41-42 supra. It should be noted, however, that 
the holding in Trattner was not that the ordinance violated the due process clause or 
equal protection clauses, but that the zoning enactment was outside the scope of the 
Illinois enabling statute. This maneuver is not available in Boraas, since New York 
state courts have upheld identical ordinances. See City of Schenectady v. Alumni Assn., 
5 App. Div. 2d 14, 168 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1957); Town of North Hempstead v. Griffin, 71 
Misc. 2d 864, 337 N.Y.S.2d 318 (Sup. Ct. 1972). 
223. 321 F. Supp. 908 (1970) a[Jd., 487 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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hood may be affected by opening R-1 zones to large, unrelated living 
groups.:'124 
The court also observed that the state had a clear interest in pre-
serving the integrity of the biological and legal family,2211 so that any 
favoritism regarding traditional families was not an indication of 
arbitrariness. 226 
The underinclusion argument presents a difficult question. While 
it is hard to say that in no case will unrelated groups cause more 
problems than traditional families,227 surely the Trottner opinion is 
correct in saying that in many instances traditional families cause the 
same problems. For instance, the ordinance would allow groups of 
blood-related individuals, regardless of group size or degree of rela-
tion, to occupy the same structure. Nevertheless, after Rodriguez, the 
Palo Alto decision, rather than Boraas, appears to be the analysis that 
will be followed. Rodriguez states that "the existence of 'some in-
equality' in the manner in which the State's rationale is achieved is 
not alone a sufficient basis for striking down the entire system,"228 and 
both Boraas and Trottner admit that unrelated groups do cause more 
noise, traffic, and congestion in some cases. It therefore cannot be 
said the classification lacks any rational basis. 
Nor does the decision in United States Department of Agriculture 
v. Moreno,229 in which the Supreme Court found a statutory scheme 
similar to the one in Boraas unconstitutional, necessarily alter this 
reasoning. Moreno involved the Department of Agriculture's food-
stamp program. Eligibility was determined on a "household" basis, 
and Congress redefined "households" to exclude groups of unrelated 
individuals.230 The Court found the definition unrelated to any statu-
tory objective. The nvo stated purposes of the food-stamp program 
were improvement of the agricultural economy through use of surplus 
commodities and the alleviation of malnutrition. The Court did not 
deal with the possible right of association involved and, in traditional 
equal protection language, held that "[t]he challenged classification 
... is clearly irrelevant to the stated purposes of the Act. ... '[T]he 
relationships among persons constituting one economic unit and 
224. 321 F. Supp. at 912-13. 
225. 321 F. Supp. at 911. 
226, The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the case should be decided 
under the strict scrutiny standard because their fundamental right of association was 
being adversely affected. 321 F. Supp. at 911-12. That issue was not reached in Boraas. 
227. However, the argument that unrelated persons typically own more automobiles 
than members of related groups and thus pose additional parking and traffic problems 
might be legitimate. 
228. 411 U.S. at 51. 
229. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
230. 7 U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970): An exception was made for unrelated individuals over 
60 years old. 
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sharing cooking facilities have nothing to do with their abilities to 
stimulate the agricultural economy ... or with their personal nutri-
tional requirements.• "231 
The Court then tried to justify the classification by relating it to 
an imputed legislative purpose. The argument was made that the 
classification was rationally related to the legitimate governmental 
purpose of preventing fraud in the food-stamp program, because 
households of unrelated persons might contain more individuals who 
would fail to report income sources. The Court differed from the 
Gunther model in that it was willing to discuss this hypothetical 
objective, but it found the classification not rationally related to the 
objective for two reasons: The Court said that the Food Stamp Act 
already contained criminal provisions, so it was doubtful that fraud 
prevention was, in truth, the objective of the new provision.232 The 
Court then noted that the practical operation of the provision had no 
effect on fraud because, by no longer purchasing food with the others 
or by using separate cooking facilities, an individual could establish 
himself as a separate "household" and still conceal income so as · to 
remain eligible for food-stamp benefits.233 While agreeing that a 
classification need not be drawn with "precise mathematical nicety" 
to be sustained, the Court concluded that the classification in question 
was not only imprecise, but without any rational basis.234 The Court 
did rely on the-information before it to reach this result and did not 
simply accept any conceivable relationship, but, as in ]ackson,235 the 
case indicates that where the information before it leads to a definite 
conclusion a court will accept that conclusion, rather than a con-
ceivable relationship shown to be inapplicable. No similar analysis 
is available in Boraa.s. 
Moreno differs from Boraa.s in that the objectives in the two cases 
are entirely different. A finding that the denial of food stamps to 
groups of unrelated persons is grossly underinclusive for dealing with 
the alleviation of malnutrition does not control a decision as to 
0 
whether the same type of classification is grossly underinclusive when 
applied to zoning goals. In spite of the virtual identity of the classifi-
cation in the two cases, the legal issues are unconnected. 
Boraa.s briefly mentioned classificatory overinclusion as a possible 
reason for voiding the Belle Terre law but seemed to equate that 
approach with less onerous means analysis.236 The Boraa.s majority 
231. 413 U.S. at 534, quoting Moreno v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 345 F. 
Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court). 
232. 413 U.S. at 536-37. The·reasoning is reminiscent of Baird. See 405 U.S. at 452. 
233. 413 U.S. at 537. 
234. 413 U.S. at 538. 
235. See text accompanying notes 62-68 supra. 
236. See 476 F.2d at 817. 
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might have found that the classification swept in so many individuals 
who were not causing traffic, noise, or parking problems that it was 
arbitrary. For example, the ordinance might have prevented three 
maiden ladies, three clergymen who only owned bicycles, or three 
judges from living in the same home. The court may have had this 
approach in mind, as the only case cited as support in the less onerous 
means section of its opinion was the New Jersey case of Kirsch Hold-
ing Co. v. Borough of Manasquan.287 
Kirsch involved a zoning ordinance, similar to that in Boraas, that 
was promulgated by a summer-resort community in an attempt to 
prevent "uninhibited social conduct of many such group rental oc-
cupants . . . [including] excessive noise at all hours, wild parties, 
intoxication, acts of immorality, lewd and lascivious conduct and 
traffic and parking congestion."238 Although the existence of these 
problems was an established fact, and the ordinances would effectively 
abolish this type of group rental, the court struck down the ordinance 
as arbitrary and unreasonable. The due process clause was utilized as 
the standard of review, and the court stated the test as follows: 
[S]ubstantive due process demands that zoning regulation ... must 
be reasonably exercised-the regulation must not be unreasonable, 
arbitrary or capricious, the means selected must have a real and 
substantial relation to the object sought to be attained, and the 
regulation or proscription must be reasonably calculated to meet the 
evil and not exceed the public need or substantially affect uses which 
do not partake of the offensive character of those which cause the 
problem sought to be ameliorated.2ao 
The court found that too many innocuous groups were excluded from 
the ordinance's definition of family, so the ordinance was not up• 
held.240 
The case might be distinguished from Boraas because of its resort 
context and because of the fact that the Belle Terre law was not aimed 
at prohibiting specific antisocial conduct, but was designed to further 
more general police power goals. However, the New Jersey supreme 
0 
court discussed the Trottner opinion favorably and also criticized an 
earlier New Jersey case 241 that had upheld a blood-related family or-
237. 59 N.J. 241, 281 A.2d 513 (1971). 
238. 59 N.J. at 245, 281 A.2d at 515. 
239. 59 N.J. at 251, 281 A.2d at 518. 
240. To the same effect, see Gabe Collins Realty, Inc. v. City of Margate City, 112 
N.J. Super. 341, 271 A.2d 430 (1970); Larson v. Mayor & Council, 99 N.J. Super. 365, 240 
A.2d 31 (1968). 
241. City of Newark v. Johnson, 70 N.J. Super. 381, 175 A.2d 500 (1961), in which 
single-family-dwelling owners had bee1,1 convicted of violating an ordinance because 
they had boarded unrelated children in their home. The children were wards of the 
State Board of Child Welfare. The ordinance was upheld as rationally related to the 
prevention of over-congestion. A statute would now require a different result, See N.J. 
STAT. ANN. 40:55-33.2 (1967). 
January 1974]
dinance in a purely residential setting. Applied to Boraas, the overin-
clusion argument would almost amount to an issue of fact: whether
the overinclusion was of such a substantial degree that the Rodriguez
imprecation, that inexact classifications must be tolerated, is sur-
mounted.2 2 The overinclusion argument provides a possible, but
somewhat tenuous, ground with which to justify the Boraas deci-
sion.243
Ironically, the standard of review offering the most promise of
overturning the Belle Terre ordinance, was not an up-to-the-minute
strict scrutiny equal protection offshoot but the tried and true min-
imal rationality formulation. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court found
that the ordinance met the minimal rationality standard.24 The
Court had the opportunity, which it ignored in both Boraas and
Rodriguez, to deal with the possible existence of a new equal pro-
tection test. This failure indicates the Court's resolve to adhere to
two-tiered equal protection. While the Court's failure to discuss the
test is to be decried, the Second Circuit's own Boraas opinion points
out the ad hoc and unprincipled nature of the nascent equal protec-
tion test that, in the end, appears to have been stillborn.
242. Art argument based on overinclusion can be encompassed within the equal
protection clause. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 13, at
at 1086-87. But see note 181 supra.
1 243. Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), which found a statutory definition creating
an "irrebuttable presumption" arbitrary by and large because it included too many
nonconforming members within the classification with no opportunity to revise their
status, would support the overinclusion approach of Kirsch. As previously noted,
however, the exact parameters of the irrebuttable presumption language have yet to be
determined. See note 206 supra. In some respects, the Kirsch decision goes beyond
Vlandis, for Ylandis contained express findings of no relation between the statutory
definition and any legitimate state objective, while the New Jersey court conceded the
relation of means to ends but nevertheless deemed the ordinance overinclusive to the
point of arbitrariness.
244. 42 U.S.L.W. at 4477.
Notes
